Evolving Concepts of Epistemic Injustice
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Abstract
This chapter delineates a distinctive class of wrongs, namely those in which someone is ingenuously downgraded and/or disadvantaged in respect of their status as an epistemic subject. A first point to make is that this kind of epistemic injustice is fundamentally a form of (direct or indirect) discrimination. The cause of testimonial injustice is a prejudice through which the speaker is misjudged and perceived as epistemically lesser (a direct discrimination). The cause of a hermeneutical injustice is a background inequality of hermeneutical opportunity - specifically, hermeneutical marginalisation in relation to some area of social experience. Hermeneutical injustice is the actualisation of unequal hermeneutical opportunity, which can be somewhat mitigated by especially virtuous epistemic and communicative conduct on the part of any individual hearer. The new applications of the concepts of testimonial and hermeneutical injustice exemplify the ground-up energies that will no doubt somewhat evolve the concepts themselves, perhaps ultimately broadening them out in unforeseen ways.
Overview
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TL;DR
Fricker clarifies and defends bounded concepts of testimonial and hermeneutical injustice as forms of discriminatory epistemic injustice, distinguishing them from distributive injustice and deliberate credibility manipulation. She argues the concepts should remain strict about non-deliberateness while evolving through applications such as healthcare and structural testimonial injustice.
Key findings
- Fricker distinguishes “discriminatory epistemic injustice” — testimonial and hermeneutical injustice — from “distributive epistemic injustice,” such as receiving less than one’s fair share of education, expert advice, or information, while advocating continued strictness for the discriminatory category.
- Testimonial injustice is an ingenuous, prejudiced misjudgement of a speaker’s credibility; deliberate manipulation of credibility relations, such as Ripley inducing Greenleaf’s sexist misperception of Marge in *The Talented Mr Ripley*, is closely related but distinct and should not blur what Ripley does and what Greenleaf does.
- Hermeneutical injustice is caused by structural hermeneutical marginalisation and unequal hermeneutical opportunity, not individual bad faith; individual virtuous listening can mitigate it, but eradication requires sufficient social equality to prevent new forms of marginalisation.
- The concepts are extended to healthcare and psychiatry: Carel and Kidd on illness, Kyratsous and Sanati on delusion diagnosis, and Anderson’s structural testimonial injustice example of an unrefreshed expert witness list, which Fricker calls “pre-emptive testimonial injustice.”
Methods
- Conceptual and normative philosophical essay; no empirical sample, data collection, or quantitative analysis is reported.
- Draws on Fricker’s prior account, secondary literature, thought experiments, and examples, including *The Talented Mr Ripley*, an imagined unrefreshed expert witness list, and applications in healthcare and psychiatry.
- Main analysis clarifies definitions, boundaries, aetiology, and implications of the concepts of testimonial and hermeneutical injustice.
Limitations
- Stated: Fricker says she “would never pretend it delivers all the answers, or makes other perspectives redundant,” and treats “start thought from marginalized lives” strictly as an enlivening methodological slogan, not as a general theory of epistemically privileged perspectives.
- Stated: the distinction between “discriminatory” and “distributive” is not intended as a deep and/or exclusive demarcation.
- Evident: the chapter offers no empirical data or systematic measurement; its claims rely on conceptual analysis and illustrative examples, so they are not empirically tested here.
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Claims the paper makes
0 Valid · 0 Not valid · 7 Not checked · 33 Own results and interpretations
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In the paper
“A first point to make is that this kind of epistemic injustice is fundamentally a form of (direct or indirect) discrimination.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
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A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Any such virtuous listening will somewhat erode hermeneutical marginalisation, because the more actively a hearer listens the more the speaker's hermeneutical marginalization is thereby eroded-they are thereby enabled to contribute more than before to the shared hermeneutical resource.”
plainstates a possible cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“So ill people tend to be hermeneutically marginalised in the sense that the non-expert terms in which they naturally and effectively understand their experiences of illness are not sufficiently shared across social space as regards the decision-making of the professionals whose judgements they rely on.”
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“On the contrary, it is a pervasive epistemic, ethical, and political phenomenon-political not only with a small 'p' but with a capital too, for manipulating credibility relations is the stock in trade of professional political campaigns, in which one side will try to get the electorate to think the other side doesn't have a clue, or cannot be trusted, or both.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
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In the paper
“This will tend to have negative effects on how they are perceived and treated non-epistemically too-secondary aspects of the intrinsic wrong.”
hedgedstates a possible cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
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In the citing paper
“More plausibly, such cases involve 'distributive' epistemic injustice, where someone receives less of an epistemic good-in this case information-than they are due (Fricker, 2017, p. 53)”
From Hidden Risks: Artificial Intelligence and Hermeneutic Harm (2025) · cites this paper as Fricker, 2017, p. 53
The cited source says what the claim attributes to it.
In the citing paper
“Fricker used the concept to describe the harm done to people in their capacity as a knower, excluding their perspective due to bias, prejudice, or structural inequality [29].”
From Disability-First AI Dataset Annotation: Co-designing Stuttered Speech Annotation Guidelines with People Who Stutter (2026) · cites this paper as [29]
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In the paper
§ Bibliography
“See Bernard Williams' essay, 'Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline'(Williams, 2009).”
§ References
“13. Williams, Bernard (2006) 'Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline' in Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline, ed. A. W. Moore, Princeton: Princeton University Press.”
Citations
Cites
The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge
Lyotard, J.-F., Bennington, G., & Massumi, B. (1984) · Poetics Today · doi:10.2307/1772278 · Cited by 14,728
(2013) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.50-6107 · Cited by 933
Relational Knowing and Epistemic Injustice: Toward a Theory of Willful Hermeneutical Ignorance
Pohlhaus, G. (2012) · Hypatia · doi:10.1111/j.1527-2001.2011.01222.x · Cited by 745
Nussbaum, M. C. (2000) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195112108.001.0001 · Cited by 368
Mason, R. (2011) · Hypatia · doi:10.1111/j.1527-2001.2011.01175.x · Cited by 265
Mills, C. W. (2015) · Routledge International Handbook of Ignorance Studies · doi:10.4324/9781315867762-27 · Cited by 265
Medina, J. (2012) · Social Epistemology · doi:10.1080/02691728.2011.652214 · Cited by 252
Contingency, irony, and solidarity: The contingency of language
Rorty, R. (1989) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511804397.003 · Cited by 55
(2017) · doi:10.4324/9781315212043-18 · Cited by 25
Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline
Williams, B. (2006) · doi:10.1515/9781400827091
Cited by
The Practical Origins of Ideas: Genealogy as Conceptual Reverse-Engineering
Queloz, M. (2021) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198868705.001.0001 · Cited by 219
Alvarado, R. (2023) · Science and Engineering Ethics · doi:10.1007/s11948-023-00451-3 · Cited by 137
Paton, M., Naidu, T., Wyatt, T. R., Oni, O., Lorello, G. R., Najeeb, U., Feilchenfeld, Z., Waterman, S. J., Whitehead, C. R., & Kuper, A. (2020) · Advances in Health Sciences Education · doi:10.1007/s10459-020-10006-x · Cited by 165
Seeking refuge? The potential of urban climate shelters to address intersecting vulnerabilities
Amorim‐Maia, A. T., Anguelovski, I., Connolly, J., & Chu, E. K. (2023) · Landscape and Urban Planning · doi:10.1016/j.landurbplan.2023.104836 · Cited by 160
Epistemic injustice in psychiatric research and practice
Kidd, I. J., Spencer, L. J., & Carel, H. (2022) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2022.2156333 · Cited by 173
Metadata
- Authors
- Fricker, M.
- Corresponding author
- Fricker, Miranda
- ORCID
- Fricker, Miranda
- Venue
- The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice
- Publisher
- Routledge
- Published
- 2017-03-31
- Pages
- 53-60
- OpenAlex
- W2597520020
- Cited by
- 515
- References
- 1
- Citations by year
- 2026: 103 · 2025: 109 · 2024: 96 · 2023: 78 · 2022: 44 · 2021: 51 · 2020: 23 · 2019: 5 · 2018: 5
- FWCI
- 51.77
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Locations
- Routledge eBooks (publishedVersion)
- White Rose Research Online (University of Leeds, The University of Sheffield, University of York) (acceptedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Hermeneutics and Narrative Identity
- Keywords
- epistemic injustice, testimonial injustice, hermeneutical injustice, discrimination, epistemic status, prejudice, intellectual virtues, social inequality
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