The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Dancing with Tax Authorities: Motivational Postures and Non-compliant Actions
Abstract
The management of tax systems is a complex business and is likely to become increasingly so in the 21st century as they are forced to adjust to the changes accompanying globalisation. The popular stereotype of the &s;tax man&s; collecting the revenue through the process of detecting non-compliance and imposing penalties provides a simplistic account of the realities of modem tax administration (see Tomkins, Packman, Russell and Colville, 2001). As tax systems are adjusted, the community needs to be educated, persuaded and encouraged to cooperate, long after the vote is cast at the ballot box. Added to this process is the universal problem of tax law, unable to respond adequately to the increasing pressures put on the tax system through the increasingly common practice of tax avoidance. What the law can not fix, tax administration must at least contain until the law catches up to close the offending loopholes, a never ending process since each piece of legislation brings new opportunities for avoidance (see McBamet, Chapter II, this volume). Containing problems of tax avoidance, checking problems of tax evasion and convincing the public that tax reforms are for the public good require a conception of taxpayers that is multidimensional and dynamic, but at the same time leaves taxpayers in no doubt about the integrity of the tax administration as a whole. This chapter provides a foundation for this new conception of the taxpayer through drawing a distinction between cooperation (or consent to being regulated) and compliance related actions. This distinction is not only critical to implementing responsive regulation, but also reflects the current state of taxpayer behaviour. This chapter reveals that those who resist most vocally, who challenge tax authority decisions and are openly critical of the institution, are not discernibly more noncompliant as a group than taxpayers who choose other ways of engaging with the system. As resisters exercise their democratic rights, they provide valuable feedback for tax administrations grappling with unprecedented pressures on their systems of revenue collection.
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Cites
The theory of planned behavior
Ajzen, I. (1991) · Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes · doi:10.1016/0749-5978(91)90020-t · Cited by 90,587
Tyler, T. R. (2006) · doi:10.1515/9781400828609 · Cited by 5,156
Cited by
Enforced versus voluntary tax compliance: The “slippery slope” framework
Kirchler, E., Hoelzl, E., & Wahl, I. (2008) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.joep.2007.05.004 · Cited by 1,351
The Role of Trust in Nurturing Compliance: A Study of Accused Tax Avoiders.
Murphy, K. (2004) · Law and Human Behavior · doi:10.1023/b:lahu.0000022322.94776.ca · Cited by 584
Murphy, K. (2005) · Journal of Law and Society · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6478.2005.00338.x · Cited by 380
WAHL, I., KASTLUNGER, B., & KIRCHLER, E. (2010) · Law & Policy · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9930.2010.00327.x · Cited by 320
Murphy, K., Tyler, T. R., & Curtis, A. (2009) · Regulation & Governance · doi:10.1111/j.1748-5991.2009.01043.x · Cited by 313
Metadata
- Venue
- Taxing Democracy
- Publisher
- Routledge
- Published
- 2017-03-02
- Pages
- 21-46
- OpenAlex
- W2233415578
- Cited by
- 231
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 109.62
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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