The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Why should we think that self-consciousness is non-reflective?
Abstract
This chapter aims to measure the consequences of the account of the opacity of the Ego on self-knowledge. The intentional translucence of conscious experience lets consciousness become fascinated by its own creation, introducing within itself the opacity of the object it constituted. The chapter shows that Jean-Paul Sartre's radical interpretation of the intentionality thesis allows him to keep separate two claims that are usually taken to stem from one another in philosophy of mind. It highlights the paradox that arises from Sartre's theory, making the quest for self-knowledge both impossible and necessary. Sartre's version of the transparency thesis says that the description of a conscious phenomenon is always reducible to the description of the way its intentional object appears. The chapter draws on Stanely Cavell's analysis of the use of first- and third-person narrators in literature in order to provide a more refined account of this paradox about the opacity of self-knowledge.
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Cites
Kripke, S. A. (2011) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199730155.003.0010 · Cited by 128
Cited by
Sorted by citations
The Projective Consciousness Model and Phenomenal Selfhood
Williford, K., Bennequin, D., Friston, K., & Rudrauf, D. (2018) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02571 · Cited by 78
“…these elements and their relationships is, of course, immense, multidisciplinary, and spans centuries (see, e.g., Zahavi, 1999, 2008; Metzinger, 2000, 2003; Frank, 2007, 2016; Kriegel, 2009; Williford et al., 2012; Zahavi and Kriegel, 2016; Billon, 2017; Guillot, 2017; Howell and Thompson, 2017).”
BackgroundSelf-Awareness and The Elusive Subject
Howell, R. J. (2023) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192849236.001.0001 · Cited by 44
A Defense of Inner Awareness: The Memory Argument Revisited
Giustina, A. (2022) · Review of Philosophy and Psychology · doi:10.1007/s13164-021-00602-0 · Cited by 30
SUBJETIVIDAD NO EGOLÓGICA EN "EL SER Y LA NADA" DE JEAN-PAUL SARTRE
Tomé, D. S. (2021) · Investigaciones Fenomenológicas · doi:10.5944/rif.15.2018.29655
Current Accounts of Subjective Character and Brentano’s Concept of Secondary Consciousness
Niemeck, M. (2020) · Primary sources in phenomenology · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-48563-4_4 · Cited by 1
Howell, R. J. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192849236.003.0003
Howell, R. J. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192849236.003.0006
The Knowledge Argument and the Subject of Experience
Howell, R. J. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192849236.003.0002
Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness
Howell, R. J. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192849236.003.0005
Howell, R. J. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192849236.003.0004
Howell, R. J. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192849236.003.0001
Howell, R. J. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192849236.002.0004
Howell, R. J. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192849236.002.0003
Fichte’s Analysis of Self-Consciousness: Critique and Refutation
Su, Y. (2024) · Fichte-Studien · doi:10.1163/18795811-05302009
Metadata
- Authors
- Frank, M.
- Corresponding author
- Manfred Frank
- Venue
- Pre-reflective Consciousness
- Publisher
- Routledge
- Published
- 2015-10-16
- Pages
- 41-60
- OpenAlex
- W2961441910
- Cited by
- 14
- References
- 1
- Citations by year
- 2024: 1 · 2023: 9 · 2022: 1 · 2021: 1 · 2020: 1 · 2018: 1
- FWCI
- 1.34
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Routledge eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Simone de Beauvoir and Sartre
- Keywords
- self-consciousness, self-knowledge, Jean-Paul Sartre, Stanley Cavell, first-person narration, third-person narration, phenomenal consciousness
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