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Epistemic Injustice, Ignorance, and Trans Experiences
Abstract
Hermeneutical injustice is the injustice of being frustrated in an attempt to render a significant social experience intelligible where hermeneutical marginalization is a significant causal factor in that failure. Someone counts as hermeneutically marginalized insofar as they belong to a social group that under-contributes to the common pool of concepts and social meanings. Trans people report experiences that are surely ones of testimonial injustice. Pre-emptive testimonial injustice is effectively an advance credibility deficit sufficient to ensure that one&s;s word is not even solicited. The testimonial injustices of various kinds suffered by trans people offer a particularly stark illustration of the connection between testimonial injustice and hermeneutical marginalization. Hermeneutical marginalization is the key condition for hermeneutical injustice, which will occur with any failed or frustrated attempt at intelligibility that is significantly due to the marginalization. Remedying hermeneutical injustice often begins by developing an operative concept that is used by a particular community to fill the hermeneutical lacuna.
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“If testimonial injustice involves an unjust deficit of credibility, then we can understand hermeneutical injustice as involving an 'unjust deficit of intelligibility' (Fricker and Jenkins 2017 : 268).”
From Agency and authority: A differentiated model of hermeneutical power (2025) · cites this paper as Fricker and Jenkins 2017
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Research works printed but not linked: 1
- Anderson, Elizabeth (2012) “Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions,” Social Epistemology 26(2): 163–173. · DOI
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Agency and authority: A differentiated model of hermeneutical power
Herissone-Kelly, R. (2025) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.1093/pq/pqaf044 · Cited by 1
Metadata
- Authors
- Fricker, M., & Jenkins, K.
- Venue
- The Routledge Companion to Feminist Philosophy
- Publisher
- Routledge
- Published
- 2017-09-19
- Pages
- 268-278
- OpenAlex
- W2736990559
- Cited by
- 108
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 21 · 2025: 27 · 2024: 27 · 2023: 11 · 2022: 9 · 2021: 8 · 2020: 4 · 2019: 1
- FWCI
- 7.84
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Routledge eBooks (publishedVersion)
- ENLIGHTEN (Jurnal Bimbingan dan Konseling Islam) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Hermeneutics and Narrative Identity
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Keywords
- epistemic injustice, hermeneutical injustice, testimonial injustice, transgender people, credibility deficit, epistemic ignorance, intelligibility
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