The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
DigiNotar: Dissecting the First Dutch Digital Disaster
Open accessAbstract
In the middle of the night on September 2, 2011, the Dutch Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations held an emergency press conference. DigiNotar, a Certificate Authority (CA), had been electronically ‘broken into’ and as a result intruders had managed to generate falsified certificates. As a CA, DigiNotar issued digital certificates to secure digital communication, but as a result of the breach the authenticity of such certificates could no longer be verified. The Dutch government subsequently revoked its trust in all certificates issued by DigiNotar. This was the beginning of the first digital disaster in the Netherlands. As a pioneering disaster, this article focuses on the implications of DigiNotar as a vital case study for future scenarios of digital disaster management. The main focus of this article is on the underlying ‘weaknesses’ of the DigiNotar incident, which allowed the situation to evolve from a problem into a disaster. These include lack of oversight, lack of security attention and risk awareness and the absence of an effective mitigation strategy. By identifying and subsequently analyzing the underlying problems, this article aims to demonstrate how future situations can be better contained if sufficient attention is granted to these factors and subsequent changes are introduced.
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Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
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In the citing paper
“A CA can misuse certificates, issue invalid certificates [52], or become the victim of a security breach leading to a wide-ranging ramification including fraudulent issuance of certificates and man-in-the-middle (MITM) and impersonation attacks [53-55].”
From A Survey of Self-Sovereign Identity Ecosystem (2021) · cites this paper as [53]
Citations
Cites
Cited by
A Survey of Self-Sovereign Identity Ecosystem
Soltani, R., Nguyen, U. T., & An, A. (2021) · Security and Communication Networks · doi:10.1155/2021/8873429 · Cited by 131
The influence of internet architecture on centralised versus distributed internet services
Arkko, J. (2020) · Journal of Cyber Policy · doi:10.1080/23738871.2020.1740753 · Cited by 30
Skierka, I. (2022) · Government Information Quarterly · doi:10.1016/j.giq.2022.101781 · Cited by 47
The KISS Principle in Software-Defined Networking: A Framework for Secure Communications
Kreutz, D., Yu, J., Verı́ssimo, P., Magalhaes, C., & Ramos, F. M. V. (2018) · IEEE Security & Privacy · doi:10.1109/msp.2018.3761717 · Cited by 21
“Finally, the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) on which TLS relies is complex and thus vulnerability prone [5], opening a large surface for successful attacks [6].”
BackgroundBlockchain Based PKI and Certificates Management in Mobile Networks
Yan, J., Hang, X., Yang, B., Su, L., & He, S. (2020) · IEEE International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications (TrustCom) · doi:10.1109/trustcom50675.2020.00242 · Cited by 20
Metadata
- Authors
- van der Meulen, N.
- Venue
- Journal of Strategic Security
- Published
- 2013-06
- Volume
- 6
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 46-58
- ISSN
- 1944-0464 (ISSN-L)
- 1944-0472
- OpenAlex
- W2156717295
- Cited by
- 59
- References
- 1
- Citations by year
- 2026: 4 · 2025: 27 · 2024: 8 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 5 · 2020: 4 · 2018: 1 · 2015: 1 · 2013: 1
- FWCI
- 1.94
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- diamond
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by-nc
- Locations
- Journal of Strategic Security (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
- Digital Commons - University of South Florida (University of South Florida) (submittedVersion)
- Digital Academic REpository of VU University Amsterdam (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam) (submittedVersion)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion)
- VU Research Portal (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Cybersecurity and Cyber Warfare Studies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Disaster Management and Resilience
- Keywords
- digital certificates, certificate revocation, security oversight, risk awareness, mitigation measures
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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
