Cited by 604Natural Resources and Economic DevelopmentCorruption and Economic DevelopmentEconomic Growth and Development

Does Mother Nature Corrupt? Natural Resources, Corruption, and Economic Growth

Open access
Leite, Carlos, Weidmann, Jens·1999·IMF Working Papers

Abstract

This paper argues that natural resource abundance creates opportunities for rent-seeking behavior and is an important factor in determining a country’s level of corruption. In a simple growth model, we illustrate the interrelationships between natural resources, corruption, and economic growth, and discuss potential anti-corruption policies. We show that the extent of corruption depends on natural resource abundance, government policies, and the concentration of bureaucratic power. Furthermore, the growth effects of natural resource discoveries and anticorruption policies crucially depend on the economy’s state of development. We empirically corroborate the model’s implications in a cross-country framework with both corruption and growth endogenized.

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Crossref · 10.5089/9781451850734.001

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  • A positive relationship between resource abundance and levels of corruption is established in a number of studies.

    “the positive relationship between resource abundance and levels of corruption is established in a number of studies (for example, Ades and Di Tella 1999; Leite and Weidman 1999).”

    From Using Natural Resources for Development: Why Has It Proven So Difficult? (2016) · cites this paper as Leite and Weidman 1999

    The Abstract says natural resource abundance helps determine a country’s level of corruption, and the Corruption Regression reports higher corruption associated with fuel and ores. But that section also reports lower corruption associated with agriculture and food, so the paper does not establish an unqualified positive relationship across all natural resources. Our copy provides no page number for these passages. (LLM, conf=0.86)

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Cites

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Research works printed but not linked: 27

  1. Bardhan, P., 1997, "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues." Journal of Economic Literature (35): 1320-46.
  2. Barro, RJ., 1991, "Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries." Quarterly Journal of Economics (106): 407-33.
  3. Becker, G., 1968, "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach." Journal of Political Economy (76): 169-217.
  4. Bhagwati, IN., 1982, "Directly Unproductive, Profit-seeking (DUP) Activities." Journal of Political Economy (90): 988-1002.
  5. Boycko, M., A Shleifer, and R Vishny, 1995, Privatizing Russia. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  6. DeLong, J.B. and L. Summers, 1991, "Equipment Investment and Economic Growth." Quarterly Journal of Economics (106): 455-502.
  7. Easterly, W., 1993, "How much Do Distortions Affect Growth?" Journal of Monetary Economics (32): 187-212.
  8. Huntington, S. P., 1968, Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
  9. Khan, A, 1994, The Political Economy of Oil. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  10. King, RG. and R Levine, 1993, "Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might be Right." Quarterly Journal of Economics, (108): 717-37.
  11. Krueger, AO., 1993, "Virtuous and Vicious Circles in Economic Development." American Economic Review (83): 351-5.
  12. ---, 1974, "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society." American Economic Review (64): 291-303.
  13. Levine, R. and D. Renelt (1992), "A Sensitivity Analysis of Cross-Country Growth Regres- sions. " American Economic Review (82): 942-964.
  14. Liu, F. T. (1985), "An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery Games", Journal of Political Economy 93 (4): 760-81.
  15. Mankiw, N., D. Romer and D. Weil, 1992, "A Contribution to the Empirics of Economic Growth." Quarterly Journal of Economics (107): 407-37.
  16. Mauro, P., 1995, "Corruption and Growth." The Quarterly Journal of Economics (90): 681-712.
  17. Murphy, K., A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny, 1993, "Why is Rent-Seeking so Costly to Growth?" American Economic Review (83): 409-14.
  18. ---, 1991, "The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth." Quarterly Journal of Eco- nomics (106): 503-30.
  19. North, D.C., 1990, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. New York: Cambridge University Press.
  20. OECD (1997) Convention On Combating Bribery Of Foreign Public Officials In International Business Transactions. Paris: OECD.
  21. Radetzki, M., 1990, A Guide to Primary Commodities in the World Economy. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
  22. Rama, M., 1993, "Rent Seeking and Economic Growth: Alternative Model and Some Empirical Evidence." Journal of Development Economics (42): 35-50.
  23. Rebelo, S, 1991, "Long Run Policy Analysis and Long Run Growth." Journal of Political Economy (99): 500-521.
  24. Sachs, J. and A. Warner, 1995a, "Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth." NBER Working Paper 5398 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research).
  25. Shleifer A. and R. Vishny, 1993, "Corruption." Quarterly Journal of Economics (59): 599-617.
  26. Short, R, 1984, "The Role of Public Enterprises: An International Statistical Comparison." In: Public Enterprise in Mixed Economies, R Floyd, C. Gray and R. Short (eds.), Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund: 110-81.
  27. Wei, S., 1997, "Why is Corruption so Much More Taxing Than Tax? Arbitrariness Kills." NBER Working Paper 6255 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research).

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Authors
Leite, C., & Weidmann, J.
Affiliations
International Monetary Fund (US)
Venue
IMF Working Papers
Published
1999-07
Volume
1999
Issue
085
Pages
1
ISSN
1018-5941 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2954912999
Cited by
604
References
1
Citations by year
2026: 16 · 2025: 28 · 2024: 20 · 2023: 31 · 2022: 19 · 2021: 31 · 2020: 28 · 2019: 26 · 2018: 41 · 2017: 29 · 2016: 36 · 2015: 30 · 2014: 22 · 2013: 25 · 2012: 20
FWCI
13.44
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
IMF Working Paper (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › General Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Natural Resources and Economic Development
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Corruption and Economic Development
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Economic Growth and Development
Keywords
natural resource wealth, corruption, economic growth, rent-seeking, anti-corruption policy, bureaucratic power, public policy, endogenous growth, natural resource discovery

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