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Genetic Testing in Underwriting: Implications for Life Insurance Markets.
Abstract
This paper discusses and analyzes the problems for life insurers when individuals obtain results from genetic tests that can have bearing on their estimated mortality. Some forms of genetic information are valuable in the underwriting process, especially test results that may be relied on by medical doctors for treatment. To the extent that test results lead to better medical care, underwriting consequences may be favorable. If the information is not allowed for underwriting, insurers will experience some degree of adverse selection, which will raise the cost of coverage for all applicants and reduce the availability of coverage. This paper considers one recent proposal in the state of Florida to extend a ban on the use of genetic test results in health insurance underwriting to life insurance, disability and long-term care (LTC). This paper concludes that the financial consequence of a ban on the use of genetic information in life insurance underwriting could significantly increase the risk of insolvency; legislation that imposes restrictions on the use of genetic information may be a reasonable compromise to a complete ban.
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“Hundreds of genetic tests are currently in use and more are being developed, see, e.g. Born (2019).”
From The Discriminating (Pricing) Actuary (2023) · cites this paper as Born (2019)
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“For an analogy to underscore this point, Born (2019) noted that '. . . over time, other types of medical tests - e.g., tests for cholesterol levels - were first considered controversial when initial evidence showed a wide variation in predicted value.'”
From The Discriminating (Pricing) Actuary (2023) · cites this paper as Born (2019)
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Research works printed but not linked: 9
- Adams, D.R., and C.M. Eng, 2018. "Next-Generation Sequencing to Diagnose Suspected Genetic Disorders," New England Journal of Medicine, 379(14): 1353-1362.
- Green, R.C., D. Lautenback, and A.L. McGuire, 2015. "GINA, Genetic Discrimination, and Genomic Medicine," New England Journal of Medicine, 372(5): 397-399.
- Klein, A.M., 2013. "Life Insurance Underwriting in the United States -Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow," British Actuarial Journal, 18(2), 486-502.
- Klitzman, R., P. Appelbaum, and W. Chung, 2014. "Should Life Insurers Have Access to Genetic Test Results?" Journal of the American Medical Association, 312(18): 1855-1856.
- Meyer, R., 1995-1996. "Genetic Testing Legislation Relating to Underwriting for Life Insurance," Journal of Insurance Medicine, 27(3): 226-227.
- Rothstein, M.A., 2018. "Time to End the Use of Genetic Test Results in Life Insurance Underwriting," The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, 46(3): 794- 801.
- Viswanathan, K. S., J. Lemaire, K. Withers, K. Armstrong, A. Baumritter, J.C. Hershey, ... and D.A. Asch, 2007. "Adverse Selection in Term Life Insurance Purchasing Due to the BRCA1/2 Genetic Test and Elastic Demand," Journal of Risk and Insurance, 74(1): 65-86.
- Zick, C.D., et. al., 2000. "Genetic Testing, Adverse Selection, and the Demand for Life Insurance," American Journal of Medical Genetics, 93(1): 29-39.
- Zick, C.D., 2005. "Genetic Testing for Alzheimer's Disease and Its Impact on Insurance Purchasing Behavior," Health Affairs, 23(2): 483-490.
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The Discriminating (Pricing) Actuary
Frees, E. W. (., & Huang, F. (2023) · North American Actuarial Journal · doi:10.1080/10920277.2021.1951296 · Cited by 56
Metadata
- Authors
- Born, P.
- Venue
- Journal of Insurance Regulation
- Published
- 2019
- ISSN
- 0736-248X
- Cited by
- 0
- References
- 0
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