The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Philosophical Case for Robot Friendship
Abstract
Friendship is an important part of the good life. While many roboticists are eager to create friendlike robots, many philosophers and ethicists are concerned. They argue that robots cannot really be our friends, but can only fake the emotional and behavioral cues we associate with friendship. Consequently, we should resist the drive to create robot friends. In this article, I argue that the philosophical critics are wrong. Using the classic virtue-ideal of friendship, I argue that robots can plausibly be considered our virtue friends—that to do so is philosophically reasonable. Furthermore, I argue that even if robots cannot be our virtue friends, they can fulfil other important friendship roles, and can complement and enhance the virtue friendships between human beings.
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Citations
Cites
The responsibility gap: Ascribing responsibility for the actions of learning automata
Matthias, A. (2004) · Ethics and Information Technology · doi:10.1007/s10676-004-3422-1 · Cited by 1,101 · cited 1×
“People are concerned about ‘responsibility gaps’ that will open up as robotic weapons systems and self-driving cars become widespread in society (Sparrow 2007; Matthias 2004; Bhuta et al 2016).”
BackgroundSPARROW, R. (2007) · Journal of Applied Philosophy · doi:10.1111/j.1468-5930.2007.00346.x · Cited by 593 · cited 2×
“People are concerned about ‘responsibility gaps’ that will open up as robotic weapons systems and self-driving cars become widespread in society (Sparrow 2007; Matthias 2004; Bhuta et al 2016).”
Cited by
Embedded Devices for Neuromorphic Time-Series Assessment
Mazumder, A. N., Hosseini, M., & Mohsenin, T. (2022) · Research Explorer (The University of Manchester) · doi:10.13016/m2ksy0-wxr3 · Cited by 652
The impacts of companion AI on human relationships: risks, benefits, and design considerations
Malfacini, K. (2025) · AI & SOCIETY · doi:10.1007/s00146-025-02318-6 · Cited by 105
“John Danaher (2019) argues social robots can both enhance and complement human relationships through serving needs that human relationships may not, allowing people to make more reasonable demands of the people in their lives, an argument that can be extended to disembodied AI.”
2022 roadmap on neuromorphic computing and engineering
Christensen, D. V., Dittmann, R., Linares-Barranco, B., Sebastian, A., Le Gallo, M., Redaelli, A., Slesazeck, S., Mikolajick, T., Spiga, S., Menzel, S., et al. (2022) · Neuromorphic Computing and Engineering · doi:10.1088/2634-4386/ac4a83
Metadata
- Authors
- Danaher, J.
- Venue
- Journal of Posthuman Studies
- Published
- 2019-03
- Volume
- 3
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 5-24
- ISSN
- 2471-4461 (ISSN-L)
- 2472-4513
- OpenAlex
- W2960368750
- Cited by
- 163
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 21.16
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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