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Cited by 49Philosophy and Theoretical ScienceEmbodied and Extended CognitionEpistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics

What Forms Could Introspective Systems Take? A Research Programme

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Kammerer, François, Frankish, Keith·2023·Journal of Consciousness Studies
DOI 10.53765/20512201.30.9.013
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Abstract

We propose a new approach to the study of introspection. Instead of asking what form introspection actually takes in humans or other animals, we ask what forms it could take, in natural or artificial minds. What are the dimensions along which forms of introspection could vary? This is a relatively unexplored question, but it is one that has the potential to open new avenues of study and reveal new connections between existing ones. It may, for example, focus attention on possible forms of introspection radically different from the human one and help to integrate competing theories of human introspection in a non-adversarial manner. We introduce and motivate the project, provide a preliminary mapping of the space of possible forms of introspection, and sketch a programme for interdisciplinary research on the topic.

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  • Kammerer and Frankish (2023) define introspection as a process by which a cognitive system represents its own current mental states, in a manner that allows the information to be used for online behavioural control.

    “According to their proposal, “[i]ntrospection is a process by which a cognitive system represents its own current mental states, in a manner that allows the information to be used for online behavioural control”.”

    From Does It Make Sense to Speak of Introspection in Large Language Models? (2025) · cites this paper as Kammerer and Frankish (2023)

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Authors
Kammerer, F., & Frankish, K.
Affiliations
  • Ruhr University Bochum (DE)
  • University of Sheffield (GB)
ORCID
Venue
Journal of Consciousness Studies
Publisher
Imprint Academic Ltd
Published
2023-09-30
Volume
30
Issue
9
Pages
13-48
ISSN
1355-8250 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.53765/20512201.30.9.013
OpenAlex
W4387419961
Cited by
49
References
3
Citations by year
2026: 37 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 1
FWCI
11.84
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Journal of Consciousness Studies (publishedVersion)
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
Keywords
self-reflection, artificial minds, interdisciplinary research program

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