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Cited by 72Corporate Insolvency and GovernanceCorporate Finance and GovernanceFinancial Distress and Bankruptcy Prediction

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Financial Distress and Corporate Governance: The Impact of Board Configuration

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Brédart, Xavier·2014·International Business Research
DOI 10.5539/ibr.v7n3p72
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Abstract

The number of filings for bankruptcy procedures has exploded since 2007 and governance has been pointed outas one of the causes. We took a dataset of 312 US firms and asked the following research question: does theboard of directors configuration have an impact on financial distress? We used a matched-pair sample of USquoted firms with half of the sample filing for Chapter 7 (liquidation) or 11 (reorganization) of the United StatesBankruptcy Code and conducted logit regression analysis. We found that some board size was significantlydifferent for firms that opted for legal protection from those that did not. This study uses corporate governanceperspective to analyse the configuration of the board and its impact on a the decision of a company to resort to abankruptcy protection law. By demonstrating that corporate governance matters in terms of financial distress,this study offers guidance to shareholders and financial institutions.

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Metadata

Authors
Brédart, X.
Affiliations
University of Mons (BE)
Corresponding author
Brédart, Xavier
ORCID
Brédart, Xavier
Venue
International Business Research
Publisher
Canadian Center of Science and Education
Published
2014-02-24
Volume
7
Issue
3
ISSN
  • 1913-9004 (ISSN-L)
  • 1913-9012
DOI
10.5539/ibr.v7n3p72
OpenAlex
W2154812988
Cited by
72
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 4 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 15 · 2022: 7 · 2021: 7 · 2020: 12 · 2019: 6 · 2018: 5 · 2017: 2 · 2016: 2 · 2015: 3 · 2014: 1
FWCI
10.79
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
cc-by
Locations
  • International Business Research (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • ORBi UMONS (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Law › Corporate Insolvency and Governance
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Accounting › Financial Distress and Bankruptcy Prediction
Keywords
financial distress, corporate governance, board size, bankruptcy filings, Chapter 11 reorganization, Chapter 7 liquidation, bankruptcy protection, US listed companies

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