Cited by 27Legal Studies and PoliciesComparative and International Law StudiesJudicial and Constitutional Studies

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 1 of the 37 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

The Relationship between Empirical Legal Studies and Doctrinal Legal Research

Open access
Davies, Gareth·2020·Erasmus Law Review

Abstract

The Relationship between Empirical Legal Studies and Doctrinal Legal Research This article considers how empirical legal studies (ELS) and doctrinal legal research (DLR) interact. Rather than seeing them as competitors that are methodologically independent and static, it suggests that they are interdependent activities, which may each be changed by interaction with the other, and that this change brings both opportunities and threats. For ELS, the article argues that DLR should properly be understood as part of its theoretical framework, yet in practice little attention is given to doctrine in empirical work. Paying more attention to DLR and legal frames generally would help ELS meet the common criticism that it is under-theorised and excessively policy oriented. On the other hand, an embrace of legal thinking, particularly of critical legal thinking, might lead to loss of status for ELS in policy circles and mainstream social science. For DLR, ELS offers a chance for it to escape the threat of insular sterility and irrelevance and to participate in a founded commentary on the world. The risk, however, is that in tailoring legal analysis to what can be empirically researched legal scholars become less analytically ambitious and more safe, and their traditionally important role as a source of socially relevant critique is weakened. Inevitably, in offering different ways of moving to normative conclusions about the law, ELS and DLR pose challenges to each other, and meeting those challenges will require sometimes uncomfortable self-reflection.

Overview

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.5553/elr.000141

Cites

15 of 15 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

71 Own interpretation · 34 Sources not found · 3 No basis given · 2 No full text of the sources · 1 Partly supported · accuracy not yet measured

  • Probably not a substantial claim. 78
  • It may state two separate claims as one. 33
86 of 86
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    ELS and DLR are distinct and identifiable categories of legal research.

    “The most obvious and immediate axes of competition are between empirical legal studies (ELS) and traditional doctrinal legal research (DLR)”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Competition for dominance is a meaningful frame for understanding the relationship between ELS and DLR.

    “whether a simple competition for dominance will play out”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Social science empirical methods are valid and can be imported into legal research.

    “to bring mainstream social science methods into law schools”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The quality of empirical research can be assessed by the methodological standards of social science.

    “meaning that it is methodologically weak”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Legal thinking and critical legal thinking are distinct from social science thinking.

    “an embrace of legal thinking, particularly of critical legal thinking”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The future of ELS and DLR can be predicted from their principled relationship.

    “One small step towards forming an expectation about this -a predictive theory perhaps -is to think about the principled relationship between ELS and DLR.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Complex systems sometimes produce unexpected results.

    “it is a truism that complex systems sometimes lead to unexpected results.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The capacity to disobey and a diversity of responses to rules are part of the humanity that law aims to protect.

    “the capacity to disobey, and a diversity of responses to rules, are part of the humanity that law aims to protect.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Legal interpretation is not a science but a skill that provides influential and valuable conceptual input into academia, politics and society.

    “Legal interpretation is not a science, but a skill that provides influential and valuable conceptual input into academia, politics and society.”
9 of 9

Claims other papers make about this one

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Citations

Cites

Show all 8 references

Research works printed but not linked: 10

  1. [12]12. Ibid.; T.J. Miles and C.R. Sunstein, 'The New Legal Realism', 75 University of Chicago Law Review 831 (2008);
  2. [13]13. M.C. Suchman and E. Mertz, 'Toward a New Legal Empiricism: Empirical Legal Studies and 33. L. Epstein and G. King, 'The Rules of Inference', 69 University of Chica- go Law Review 114 (2002);
  3. [14]14. M.J. Madison, 'The Idea of the Law Review: Scholarship, Prestige and Open Access', 10 Lewis and Clark Law Review 901 (2006);
  4. [16]16. M.L. Daub- er, 'The Big Muddy', 57 Stanford Law Review 1899 (2005);
  5. [17]17. F.B. Cross, 'Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance', 92 Northwestern University Law Review 251 (1997).
  6. [18]18. Eisenberg (2011), above n. 13; F. Cross et al., 'Above the Rules: A Response to Epstein and King', 69 University of Chicago Law Review 135 (2002);
  7. [24]24. P. Schlag, 'Spam Jurisprudence, Air Law, and the Rank Anxiety of Noth- ing Happening (a Report on the State of the Art)', 97 Georgetown Law Journal 803 (2009);
  8. [33]33. Towfigh, above n. 4; E.H. Tiller and F. B. Cross, 'What Is Legal Doc- trine', 100 Northwestern University Law Review 517 (2006);
  9. [38]38. See the special edition of Law and Social Inquiry on this: SYMPOSIUM: New Legal Realism's Second Decade: Toward a Theoretical Foundation for Legal Empiricism, 43(2) Law and Social Inquiry 292-584 (2018).
  10. [43]43. T.M. Hagle, 'Two Worlds, Neither Perfect: A Comment on the Tension between Legal and Empirical Studies', 63 Buffalo Law Review 379 (2015); Tiller and Cross, ibid.

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Metadata

Authors
Davies, G.
Affiliations
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (NL)
Corresponding author
Davies, Gareth
Venue
Erasmus Law Review
Published
2020-09
Volume
13
Issue
2
Pages
3-12
ISSN
2210-2671 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W3032914661
Cited by
26
References
8
Citations by year
2026: 10 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 2 · 2020: 1
FWCI
9.81
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
other-oa
Locations
  • Erasmus Law Review (publishedVersion, other-oa)
  • VU Research Portal (publishedVersion, other-oa)
  • RePub (Erasmus University Rotterdam) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • SSRN Electronic Journal (submittedVersion)
  • Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Law › Legal Studies and Policies
  • Social Sciences › Law › Comparative and International Law Studies
  • Social Sciences › Law › Judicial and Constitutional Studies
Keywords
empirical legal research, legal theory, critical legal thinking, legal scholarship

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