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Bitcoin Mining Pools: A Cooperative Game Theoretic Analysis
Abstract
Bitcoin is an innovative decentralized cryptocurrency whose core security relies on a “proof of work ” procedure, which requires network participants to repeatedly compute hashes on inputs from a large search space. Finding one of the rare inputs that generates an extremely low hash value is consid-ered a successful attempt, allowing miners to approve new transactions and, in return, to collect rewards in bitcoins. This reward allocation, which provides the incentive for miners to participate, is a random process with a large vari-ance. Miners who desire a steady income thus often par-ticipate in mining pools that divide among their members the earned rewards, and reduce this variance. Mining pools are slightly better at coordinating participants due to lower-latency communication, a fact which implies that they man-age to collect slightly higher rewards. We examine dynamics of pooled mining and the rewards that pools manage to collect, and use cooperative game the-oretic tools to analyze how pool members may share these rewards. We show that for some network parameters, es-pecially under high transaction loads, it is difficult or even impossible to distribute rewards in a stable way: some par-ticipants are always incentivized to switch between pools.
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Cited by
A Survey on Security and Privacy Issues of Bitcoin
Conti, M., Sandeep Kumar, E., Lal, C., & Ruj, S. (2018) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2018.2842460 · Cited by 1,116
Stubborn Mining: Generalizing Selfish Mining and Combining with an Eclipse Attack
Nayak, K., Kumar, S., Miller, A., & Shi, E. (2016) · 2016 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P) · doi:10.1109/eurosp.2016.32 · Cited by 481
Optimal Selfish Mining Strategies in Bitcoin
Sapirshtein, A., Sompolinsky, Y., & Zohar, A. (2017) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-662-54970-4_30 · Cited by 477
Self-citationZohar, A. (2015) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/2701411 · Cited by 327
Self-citationCloud/Fog Computing Resource Management and Pricing for Blockchain Networks
Xiong, Z., Feng, S., Wang, W., Niyato, D., Wang, P., & Han, Z. (2019) · IEEE Internet of Things Journal · doi:10.1109/jiot.2018.2871706 · Cited by 303
Metadata
- Authors
- Lewenberg, Y., Bachrach, Y., Sompolinsky, Y., Zohar, A., & Rosenschein, J. S.
- Published
- 2015-05-04
- Pages
- 919-927
- DOI
- 10.5555/2772879.2773270
- OpenAlex
- W2263222003
- Cited by
- 213
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 54.96
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Lewenberg, Y., Bachrach, Y., Sompolinsky, Y., Zohar, A., & Rosenschein, J. S. (2015). Bitcoin Mining Pools: A Cooperative Game Theoretic Analysis. https://doi.org/10.5555/2772879.2773270
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