Cited by 1Philosophical Ethics and TheoryEpistemology, Ethics, and MetaphysicsTheology and Philosophy of Evil

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ON VAGUE ESCHATOLOGY

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Almeida, Michael J., The Society of Christian Philosophers·2008·Faith and Philosophy

Abstract

Ted Sider's Proportionality o f Justice condition requires that any two moral agents instantiating nearly the same moral state be treated in nearly the same way.I provide a countermodel in supervaluation semantics to the proportion ality of justice condition.It is possible that moral agents S and S' are in nearly the same moral state, S' is beyond all redemption and S is not.It is consistent with perfect justice then that moral agents that are not beyond redemption go determinately to heaven and moral agents that are beyond all redemption go determinately to hell.I conclude that moral agents that are in nearly the same moral state may be treated in very unequal ways.

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Crossref · 10.5840/faithphil200825439

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Claims the paper makes

69 Own interpretation · 12 No basis given · 4 Sources not found

Show all 44 claims

  • It may state two separate claims as one. 20
  • Probably not a substantial claim. 28
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  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Universalism is false.

    “Since we have assumed that universalism is false, an adequate principle of justice must provide a moral justifi cation for distributing punishments and rewards in such a way that some people go determinately and eternally to heaven and some people go determinately and eternally to hell.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Only those moral agents that are beyond redemption go determinately and eternally to hell.

    “Let's stipulate fi nally that only those moral agents that are beyond redemption go determinately and eternally to hell.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Every moral state in sequence S is instantiated.

    “The Degree of Goodness Argument assumes that there are moral agents instantiating every moral state in the sequence.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    There are insignificant evils: increments insignificant enough that k (n+1)i is not definitely worse than k ni.

    “It is assumed that there are increments (or decrements) insignifi cant enough that the moral state k (n+1)i resulting from having commi ed n + 1 minor evils is not defi nitely worse than the moral state k ni resulting from having commi ed n minor evils.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    No moral agent that does not reject God as his savior is beyond redemption.

    “Suppose it is true that no moral agent that does not reject God as his savior-no ma er how many obscenities he has u ered during his lifetime-is beyond redemption.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Only those moral agents that reject God as savior go determinately and eternally to hell.

    “We are assuming instead that only those moral agents that reject God as savior go determinately and eternally to hell.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    God provides every moral agent with a final opportunity to accept or reject him as savior.

    “Let's suppose that God provides every moral agent with a fi nal opportunity to accept or reject him as his savior.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Everyone knows that only those moral agents that definitely reject God as their savior are sent determinately and eternally to hell, and everyone knows that every moral agent that does not definitely reject God as their savior is sent determinately and eternally to heaven.

    “We assume that everyone knows that only those moral agents that defi nitely reject God as their savior are sent determinately and eternally to hell.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    For every card in the sequence there is some moral agent that holds up that card.

    “Assume that for every card in the sequence there is some moral agent that holds up that card.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    PJ1: Moral agents that are definitely irredeemably evil cannot be saved and so must go determinately and eternally to hell.

    “PJ1.Moral agents that are defi nitely irredeemably evil cannot be saved and so must go determinately and eternally to hell.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    PJ2: Moral agents that are borderline irredeemably evil can be saved and so go determinately to heaven.

    “PJ2. Moral agents that are borderline irredeemably evil can be saved and so go determinately to heaven.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    PJ3: Every moral agent that definitely rejects God as his savior cannot be saved and so goes determinately and eternally to hell.

    “PJ3.Every moral agent that defi nitely rejects God as his savior cannot be saved and so goes determinately and eternally to hell.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    PJ4: Every moral agent that does not definitely reject God as his savior can be saved and so goes determinately and eternally to heaven.

    “PJ4.Every moral agent that does not defi nitely reject God as his savior can be saved and so goes determinately and eternally to heaven.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Every moral state in the sequence is instantiated.

    “The right response to the objection from higher-order vagueness is to note that, by hypothesis, every moral state in the sequence is instantiated.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    There are very small increments in evil.

    “We have been supposing that there are very small increments in evil.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    It is possible that moral agents instantiate every moral state in the sequence.

    “Strictly, the Degree of Goodness Argument assumes that it is possible that moral agents instantiate every moral state in the sequence, not that moral agents actually instantiate every moral state in the sequence.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Possibly there is a point at which any agent that instantiates an irredeemably evil moral state is beyond redemption.

    “We are assuming that, possibly, there is a point at which any agent that instantiates an irredeemably evil moral state is beyond redemption.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    The property of being irredeemably evil is vague.

    “My assumption that the property of being irredeemably evil is vague concedes to Sider that u ering one minor obscenity cannot change an agent from being defi nitely redeemable to being defi nitely irredeemable.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    There are borderline cases of being irredeemably evil in which it is not true that S is irredeemably evil and not false that S is irredeemably evil.

    “I assume there are borderline cases of being irredeemably evil in which it is not true that S is irredeemably evil and not false that S is irredeemably evil.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Possibly PJ1 and PJ2 are true.

    “I assume that possibly PJ1 and PJ2 are true and in those worlds they are the principles God applies.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    The assumption of divine control must be consistent with Sider's assumption of non-universalism and God's perfect justice.

    “The assumption of divine control must be consistent with Sider's assumption of non-universalism and God's perfect justice.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    It is consistent with God's perfect justice that some moral agents are sent determinately and eternally to hell.

    “According to these assumptions, it is consistent with God's perfect justice that some moral agents are sent determinately and eternally to hell.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Some moral states k_ni and k_mi in the sequence are such that an agent that instantiates k_ni is redeemable and an agent that instantiates k_mi is irredeemable.

    “The assertion is intended to follow directly from the assumption that some moral states k ni and k mi in the sequence of moral states from k 0 to k are such that an agent that instantiates k ni is redeemable and an agent that instantiates k mi is irredeemable.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    An agent S instantiates an irredeemably evil moral state k_ni if and only if S is himself irredeemably evil.

    “We have supposed that an agent S instantiates an irredeemably evil moral state k ni if and only if S is himself irredeemably evil.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    A moral state k_ni is irredeemably evil if and only if k_ni is sufficiently bad that God cannot save any agent that instantiates k_ni.

    “Further we have supposed that a moral state k ni is irredeemably evil if and only if k ni is suffi ciently bad that God cannot save any agent that instantiates k ni .”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    No one indefinitely holds up his card.

    “To avoid additional sources of vagueness, we should add the simplifying assumption that no one indefi nitely holds up his card.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    We can measure the size and number of small evils.

    “Assuming we can measure the size and number of small evils, n is some positive integer and i is some small real value.”
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Metadata

Authors
Almeida, M. J., & The Society of Christian Philosophers
Corresponding author
Almeida, Michael J.
Venue
Faith and Philosophy
Published
2008
Volume
25
Issue
4
Pages
359-375
ISSN
0739-7046 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2086082254
Cited by
1
References
0
Citations by year
2013: 1
FWCI
0.00
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Faith and Philosophy (publishedVersion)
  • ePlace - Preserving, Learning, and Creative Exchange (Asbury Theological Seminary) (submittedVersion)
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Theology and Philosophy of Evil
Keywords
vagueness, eschatology, moral state, redemption, heaven and hell, countermodels

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