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Causation and Ceteris Paribus Laws
Abstract
Ned Hall is associate professor of philosophy in the Department of Linguistics & Philosophy at MIT.His research interests focus on topics in the area of overlap between metaphysics and philosophy of science (especially counterfactuals, causation, laws of nature, and probability), as well as issues in the foundations of biology and of quantum physics.He recently edited, with L. A. Paul and John Collins, a collection of new essays on counterfactuals and causation, and is working on a book on the same subject.
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“It is at this point that the special sciences get to have a say: for what they aim to discover are not laws in anything like the sense at work in fundamental physics, but rather”
From Humean Reductionism about Laws of Nature (2015) · cites this paper as Hall 2005
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Research works printed but not linked: 8
- Earman, J., and J. Roberts. 1999. 'Ceteris Paribus', There Is No Problem of Provisos. Synthese 118: pp. 439-478.
- Hall, N. 2004. The Intrinsic Character of Causation. In vol. 1 of Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, ed. D. Zimmerman (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- Hitchcock, C. 2001. The Intransitivity of Causation Revealed in Equations and Graphs. Journal of Philosophy 98: pp. 273-299.
- Lewis, D. 1973. Causation. Journal of Philosophy 70: pp. 556-67.
- ----. 1980. Mad Pain and Martian Pain. In vol. 1 of Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, ed. N. Block (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 216-222.
- ----. 2000. Causation as Influence. Journal of Philosophy 97: pp. 182-197.
- Ramachandran, M. 1997. A Counterfactual Analysis of Causation. Mind 151: pp. 263-77.
- Yablo, S. 2002. De Facto Dependence. Journal of Philosophy 99: pp. 130-148.
Cited by
Humean Reductionism about Laws of Nature
Hall, N. (2015) · A Companion to David Lewis · doi:10.1002/9781118398593.ch17 · Cited by 170
“Humean Reductionism About Laws Of Nature Ned Hall §0 Introduction By far the most central and important question about laws of nature is this: Are they mere patterns in the phenomena (patterns that are in some way salient, to be sure—but still, nothing more than patterns)?”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Hall, N., & Philosophy, T. H. R. O.
- Venue
- The Harvard Review of Philosophy
- Publisher
- Philosophy Documentation Center
- Published
- 2005
- Volume
- 13
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 80-99
- ISSN
- 1062-6239
- Cited by
- 2
- References
- 0
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