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The Multiple Realizability of Biological Individuals
Abstract
Biological theory demands a clear organism concept, but at present biologists cannot agree on one. They know that counting particular units, and not counting others, allows them to generate explanatory and predictive descriptions of evolutionary processes. Yet they lack a unified theory telling them which units to count. In this paper, I offer a novel account of biological individuality, which reconciles conflicting definitions of ‘organism’ by interpreting them as describing alternative realisers of a common functional role, and then defines individual organisms as essentially possessing some mechanisms that play this role.
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Citations
Cited by
Biological Autonomy: A Philosophical and Theoretical Enquiry
Moreno, A., & Mossio, M. (2015) · History, Philosophy and Theory of the Life Sciences · doi:10.1007/978-94-017-9837-2 · Cited by 397
On the origin of biological construction, with a focus on multicellularity
van Gestel, J., & Tarnita, C. E. (2017) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1704631114 · Cited by 98
Metadata
- Authors
- Clarke, E., & Journal of Philosophy Inc.
- Venue
- Journal of Philosophy
- Publisher
- Philosophy Documentation Center
- Published
- 2013
- Volume
- 110
- Issue
- 8
- Pages
- 413-435
- ISSN
- 0022-362X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W195867294
- Cited by
- 170
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 47.91
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Clarke, E., & Journal of Philosophy Inc. (2013). The Multiple Realizability of Biological Individuals. Journal of Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil2013110817
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.