Epistemic Environmentalism
Open accessAbstract
I motivate and develop a normative framework for undertaking work in applied epistemology. I set out the framework, which I call epistemic environmentalism, explaining the role of social epistemology and epistemic value theory in the framework. Next, I explain the environmentalist terminology that is employed and its usefulness. In the second part of the paper, I make the case for a specific epistemic environmentalist proposal. I argue that dishonest testimony by experts and certain institutional testifiers should be liable to the sanction of inclusion on a register of epistemic polluters. In doing so, I explain the special role that experts and the relevant institutional testifiers play in the epistemic environment and how the proposal is justified on the basis of that special role.
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Epistemic injustices pollute the epistemic environment, making it difficult to reason about knowledge, reject false premises, or find verified facts.
“Epistemic injustices not only render marginalized groups discredited and invisibilized, they pollute the epistemic environment (Ryan 2018), making it difficult to reason about knowledge, reject false premises, or find verified facts.”
From Epistemic Injustice in Generative AI (2024) · cites this paper as Ryan 2018
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Epistemic Injustice in Generative AI
Kay, J., Kasirzadeh, A., & Mohamed, S. (2024) · Proceedings of the AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society · doi:10.1609/aies.v7i1.31671 · Cited by 76 · see citing works
- Authors
- Ryan, S., & Philosophy Documentation Center
- Corresponding author
- Ryan, Shane
- ORCID
- Ryan, Shane
- Venue
- Journal of Philosophical Research
- Publisher
- Philosophy Documentation Center
- Published
- 2018
- Volume
- 43
- Pages
- 97-112
- ISSN
- 1053-8364 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4243753228
- Cited by
- 65
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 31 · 2024: 9 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 1 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 14
- FWCI
- 29.14
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- Licence
- other-oa
- Locations
- Journal of Philosophical Research (publishedVersion)
- Singapore Management University Institutional Knowledge (InK) (Singapore Management University) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Nazarbayev University Repository (Nazarbayev University) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Keywords
- applied epistemology, social epistemology, expert testimony, epistemic norms
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