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Six Signs of Scientism

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Haack, Susan, Romanian Academy - Iasi Branch · 2012 · Logos & Episteme

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; none of the 41 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.

Abstract

As the English word “scientism” is currently used, it is a trivial verbal truth that scientism—an inappropriately deferential attitude to science—should be avoided. But it is a substantial question when, and why, deference to the sciences is inappropriate or exaggerated. This paper tries to answer that question by articulating “six signs of scientism”: the honorific use of “science” and its cognates; using scientific trappings purely decoratively; preoccupation with demarcation; preoccupation with “scientific method”; looking to the sciences for answers beyond their scope; denying the legitimacy or worth of non-scientific (e.g., legal or literary) inquiry, or of writing poetry or making art.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

The paper argues that “scientism” is an inappropriately deferential attitude toward science and proposes six signs for recognizing it. It distinguishes legitimate respect for science from exaggerated deference, using examples from law, social science, philosophy, and ethics.

Key findings

  • The paper articulates “six signs of scientism”: honorific use of “science” and related terms; decorative borrowing of scientific trappings; preoccupation with demarcation; preoccupation with “scientific method”; looking to the sciences for answers beyond their scope; and denying the legitimacy or worth of non-scientific inquiry or activities such as poetry or art.
  • It argues there is no single “scientific method” used by all and only scientists; instead, serious empirical inquiry shares a general pattern, while scientific tools and techniques are varied, evolving, and often field-specific.
  • It argues that demarcation is fuzzy: “science” has no clear boundaries, and we should recognize continuities between scientific and other inquiry rather than treat poor work as simply “not science.”
  • It argues that sciences can inform means and contribute to ethical questions, but cannot by themselves determine desirable ends; treating “most people think x is morally better” as equivalent to “x is morally better” is a sign of scientism.

Methods

  • Philosophical/conceptual essay; no empirical sample or formal quantitative analysis is reported.
  • The paper develops its argument by articulating six signs of scientism and illustrating them with examples from law, social science, economics, philosophy publishing, and medical ethics.
  • It draws on philosophers and scientists such as Popper, Bridgman, Dewey, Peirce, Hayek, and others to analyze scientism and distinguish it from legitimate respect for science.

Limitations

  • The paper states that the line between appropriate respect for science and inappropriate deference is often thin, that “science” has no clear boundaries, and that demarcation can only be approximate.
  • It acknowledges that discriminating the effects of scientific advances from those of industrialization, urbanization, and globalization is “formidably difficult, and perhaps not even possible.”
  • Evident from the text: the argument is conceptual and illustrative rather than systematic or empirical, with examples selected to support the six signs rather than to test them.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.5840/logos-episteme20123151

Cites

0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Figures

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Verification

Claims the paper makes

0 Valid · 1 Not valid · 35 Not checked · 96 Own results and interpretations

34 more claims

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  • It may state two separate claims as one. 29
  • Probably not a substantial claim. 75

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Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.

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Citations

Cites

The publisher hasn’t deposited this paper’s reference list.

Research works printed but not linked: 23

  1. ABRAHAMSON, David. (1960). The Psychology of Crime. New York: Columbia University Press.
  2. DO CHARTERS 'CREAM' THE BEST? En: Wall Street Journal. Septiembre 24 de 2009. p. A20.
  3. FENSTAD, E.-J. et al. (2003). 'Preámbulo'. En: Declaration on Science and the Use of Scientific Knowledge. UNESCO World Conference on Science 2003. p. 4. [citado 15 septiembre 2009]. Disponible en internet: <http://www. unesco.org/science/wcs/eng/declaration\_e.htm>
  4. GROSS, Paul R.; LEVITT, Norman & LEWIS, Martin. (Eds). (1997). The Flight from Science and Reaso n (1996). Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
  5. \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_. (2005). 'Trial and Error: The Supreme Court's Philosophy of Science'. En: American Journal of Public Health. 95, p. 66-73.
  6. \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_. (2007). 'Peer Review and Publication: Lessons for Lawyers'. En: Stetson Law Review. 36, p. 789-819.
  7. HOBBS, A. H. (1953). Social Problems and Scientism . Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Press.
  8. HOTZ, Robert Lee. 'Magic Flute: Primal Find Sings of Music's Mystery'. En: Wall Street Journal. Julio 3-5 de 2009. p. A9.
  9. \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_. 'Tracing the Origins of Human Empathy'. En: Wall Street Journal. Septiembre 26 de 2009. p. A1.
  10. \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_. 'Fossils Shed Light on Human Past'. En: Wall Street Journal. Octubre 2 de 2009. p. A3.
  11. HYLAND, William G. Jr. (2009). In Defense of Thomas Jefferson: The Sally Hemings Sex Scandal. New York: St. Martin's Press.
  12. KEATES, Nancy. 'From Barn Raisings to Home Building: Consumers Hire Amish Builders, Citing Craftsmanship, Costs'. En: Wall Street Journal. Agosto 15 de 2008. p. W1 .
  13. MERTON, Robert. (1968). Social Theory and Social Structure (1957). Glencoe, IL: Free Press (edición aumentada).
  14. NANDA, Meera. (1998). 'The Epistemic Charity of Social Constructivist Critics of Science and Why the Third World Should Reject the Offer'. En: KEORTGE, Noretta (Ed.). A House Built on Sand: Exposing Post-Modern Myths about Science . New York: Oxford University Press.
  15. PEIRCE, Charles Sanders. (1931-58). Collected Papers. HARTSHORNE, Ch.; WEISS, P. (vol. 7-8) y BURKS, A. (Eds). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
  16. PORTUGAL, Franklin H. & COHEN, Jack S. (1977). A Century of DNA: A History of the Discovery of the Structure and Function of the Genetic Substance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  17. RAVETZ, Jerome. (1971). Scientific Knowledge and Its Social Problems. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
  18. REYNOLDS, James E. F. (Ed). (1993). Martindale: The Extra Pharmacopoeia. 30a ed. London: Pharmaceutical Press.
  19. SNOW, C. P. (1964). 'The Two Cultures' (1959). En: The Two Cultures and a Second Look. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  20. TRUSEDELL, C. (1968). Essays in the History of Mechanics. New York: Springer.
  21. \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_. (1952). The Counter-Revolution of Science. Glencoe, IL: Free Press. WEINBERG, Steven. (1993). Dreams of a Final Theory. New York: Vintage Books.
  22. WHITE, Gregory L. 'GM Takes Advice from Disease Sleuths to Debug Cars'. En: Wall Street Journal. Abril 8 de 1999. p. B1, B4.
  23. WISH YOU WERE HERE. (1998). En: Oxford Today. 10.3, p. 40.

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Haack, S., & Romanian Academy - Iasi Branch
Affiliations
Miami University (US)
Corresponding author
Haack, Susan
Venue
Logos & Episteme
Published
2012
Volume
3
Issue
1
Pages
75-95
ISSN
2069-0533 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2094055398
Cited by
59
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 6 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 8 · 2023: 7 · 2022: 6 · 2021: 6 · 2020: 9 · 2019: 3 · 2018: 4 · 2017: 1 · 2016: 1 · 2015: 2 · 2014: 1
FWCI
8.50
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
cc-by-nc
Locations
  • Logos & Episteme (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
  • Repositorio Universidad de Caldas (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • Scholarship@Western (Western University) (submittedVersion)
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
  • Discusiones Filosóficas
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Logic and Philosophy of Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Thought and Analysis
Keywords
scientism, demarcation problem, scientific method, scope of science, philosophy of science

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Six Signs of Scientism. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.5840/logos-episteme20123151
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Haack, S., & Romanian Academy - Iasi Branch. (2012). Six Signs of Scientism. Logos & Episteme. https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme20123151

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.