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Two Faces of Responsibility
Abstract
This chapter distinguishes two perspectives implicated in our ordinary conception of responsibility, each of which reflects distinct but overlapping ethical interests. The most basic perspective is attributability, in which actions are imputable to individuals as exercises of their agency. The attitudes expressed in such behaviour are subject to assessment in ethical terms. The significance of attributable behaviour is not its causal relation to the “deep self ” but that it expresses what the agent stands for in this activity. This “face” of responsibility is of central importance in human life but by itself fails to explain the normative relation of interpersonal accountability. This leaves an opening for a kind of scepticism that is independent of the validity of attributability. This distinction helps to make sense of our ambivalence towards vicious individuals with horrendous upbringings and to clarify apparent asymmetries between praise and blame.
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Citations
Cited by
Autonomy, Vulnerability, Recognition, and Justice
Anderson, J., & Honneth, A. (2005) · Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511610325.008 · Cited by 437
Control, responsibility, and moral assessment
Smith, A. M. (2008) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-006-9048-x · Cited by 406
Recent Work on Moral Responsibility
Fischer, J. M. (1999) · Ethics · doi:10.1086/233206 · Cited by 395
Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability: In Defense of a Unified Account
Smith, A. M. (2012) · Ethics · doi:10.1086/664752 · Cited by 352
Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism: New Essays
Christman, J., & Anderson, J. (2005) · Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511610325.002 · Cited by 340
Metadata
- Authors
- Watson, G., & University of Arkansas Press
- Venue
- Philosophical Topics
- Publisher
- Philosophy Documentation Center
- Published
- 1996
- Volume
- 24
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 227-248
- ISSN
- 0276-2080 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2137209613
- Cited by
- 920
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 11.38
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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