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The Body in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty

Carman, Taylor, University of Arkansas Press · 1999 · Philosophical Topics
Cited by 215

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Abstract

The terminological boxes into which we press the history of philosophy often obscure deep and important differences among major figures supposedly belonging to a single school of thought. One such disparity within the phenomenological movement, often overlooked but by no means invisible, separates Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception from the Husserlian program that initially inspired it. For Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology amounts to a radical, if discreet, departure not only from Husserl’s theory of intentionality generally, but more specifically from his account of the intentional constitution of the body and its role in perceptual experience.

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  • Next Steps for Human-Computer Integration

    Mueller, F. F., Lopes, P., Strohmeier, P., Ju, W., Seim, C., Weigel, M., Nanayakkara, S., Obrist, M., Li, Z., Delfa, J., et al. (2020) · Proceedings of the 2020 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems · doi:10.1145/3313831.3376242 · Cited by 260

    “People assume their one movements to be equivalent to the movements of others [11].”
    Background

See all 215

Metadata

Authors
Carman, T., & University of Arkansas Press
Venue
Philosophical Topics
Published
1999
Volume
27
Issue
2
Pages
205-226
ISSN
0276-2080 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W1973993919
Cited by
215
References
0
FWCI
0.00
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Body in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.5840/philtopics199927210
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Carman, T., & University of Arkansas Press. (1999). The Body in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. Philosophical Topics. https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics199927210

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