The Body in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty
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Abstract
The terminological boxes into which we press the history of philosophy often obscure deep and important differences among major figures supposedly belonging to a single school of thought. One such disparity within the phenomenological movement, often overlooked but by no means invisible, separates Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception from the Husserlian program that initially inspired it. For Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology amounts to a radical, if discreet, departure not only from Husserl’s theory of intentionality generally, but more specifically from his account of the intentional constitution of the body and its role in perceptual experience.
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“People assume their one movements to be equivalent to the movements of others [11].”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Carman, T., & University of Arkansas Press
- Venue
- Philosophical Topics
- Publisher
- Philosophy Documentation Center
- Published
- 1999
- Volume
- 27
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 205-226
- ISSN
- 0276-2080 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1973993919
- Cited by
- 215
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 0.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Carman, T., & University of Arkansas Press. (1999). The Body in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. Philosophical Topics. https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics199927210
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