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Seeing and visualizing: it's not what you think
Abstract
In Seeing and Visualizing, Zenon Pylyshyn argues that seeing is different thinking and that to see is not, as it may seem intuitively, to create an inner replica of the world. Pylyshyn examines how we see and how we visualize and why the scientific account does not align with the way these processes seem to us from the inside. In doing so, he addresses issues in vision science, cognitive psychology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive neuroscience. First, Pylyshyn argues that there is a core stage of vision independent the influence of our prior beliefs and examines how vision can be intelligent and yet essentially knowledge-free. He then proposes that a mechanism within the vision module, called a visual index (or FINST), provides a direct preconceptual connection between parts of visual representations and things in the world, and he presents various experiments that illustrate the operation of this mechanism. He argues that such a deictic reference mechanism is needed to account for many properties of vision, including how mental images attain their apparent spatial character without themselves being laid out in space in our brains. The final section of the book examines the picture theory of mental imagery, including recent neuroscience evidence, and asks whether any current evidence speaks to the issue of the format of mental images. This analysis of mental imagery brings together many of the themes raised throughout the book and provides a framework for considering such issues as the distinction between the form and the content of representations, the role of vision in thought, and the relation between behavioral, neuroscientific, and phenomenological evidence regarding mental representations.
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Cited by
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Bechtel, W., & Abrahamsen, A. (2005) · Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.shpsc.2005.03.010 · Cited by 1,138
Mental imagery: In search of a theory
Pylyshyn, Z. W. (2002) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x02000043 · Cited by 722
Embodied Perception and the Economy of Action
Proffitt, D. R. (2006) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.1745-6916.2006.00008.x · Cited by 696
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Metadata
- Venue
- Choice Reviews Online
- Publisher
- American Library Association
- Published
- 2004-10-01
- Volume
- 42
- Issue
- 02
- Pages
- 42-1247-42-1247
- ISSN
- 0009-4978 (ISSN-L)
- 1523-8253
- OpenAlex
- W2056746587
- Cited by
- 384
- References
- 0
- Type
- book review
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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