The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Why welfare states persist: the importance of public opinion in democracies
Abstract
The world's richer democracies all provide such public benefits as pensions and health care, but why are some far more generous than others? And why, in the face of globalization and fiscal pressures, has the welfare state not been replaced by another model? Reconsidering the myriad issues raised by such pressing questions, Clem Brooks and Jeff Manza contend here that public opinion has been an important, yet neglected, factor in shaping welfare states in recent decades. Analyzing data on sixteen countries, Brooks and Manza find that the preferences of citizens profoundly influence the welfare policies of their governments and the behavior of politicians in office. Shaped by slow-moving forces such as social institutions and collective memories, these preferences have counteracted global pressures that many commentators assumed would lead to the welfare state's demise. Moreover, Brooks and Manza show that cross-national differences in popular support help explain why Scandinavian social democracies offer so much more than liberal democracies such as the United States and the United Kingdom. Significantly expanding our understanding of both public opinion and social policy in the world's most developed countries, this landmark study will be essential reading for scholars of political economy, public opinion, and democratic theory.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
Terjesen, S., Aguilera, R. V., & Lorenz, R. (2015) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-014-2083-1 · Cited by 703
Explaining Social Policy Preferences: Evidence from the Great Recession
MARGALIT, Y. (2013) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055412000603 · Cited by 651
The Structure of Inequality and the Politics of Redistribution
LUPU, N., & PONTUSSON, J. (2011) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055411000128 · Cited by 484
A Long Goodbye to Bismarck? : The Politics of Welfare Reform in Continental Europe
(2010) · Amsterdam University Press eBooks · doi:10.5117/9789089642349 · Cited by 460
Solidarity in diverse societies: beyond neoliberal multiculturalism and welfare chauvinism
Kymlicka, W. (2015) · Comparative Migration Studies · doi:10.1186/s40878-015-0017-4 · Cited by 382
Insecure Alliances: Risk, Inequality, and Support for the Welfare State
REHM, P., HACKER, J. S., & SCHLESINGER, M. (2012) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055412000147 · Cited by 315
Reconsidering Policy Feedback: How Policies Affect Politics
Béland, D. (2010) · Administration & Society · doi:10.1177/0095399710377444 · Cited by 300
Social Policy by Popular Demand
Rehm, P. (2011) · World Politics · doi:10.1017/s0043887111000037 · Cited by 270
Aarøe, L., & Petersen, M. B. (2014) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1017/s002238161400019x · Cited by 254
The Two Facets of Social Policy Preferences
Cavaillé, C., & Trump, K.-S. (2015) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/678312 · Cited by 241
Busemeyer, M. R., & Garritzmann, J. L. (2017) · Journal of European Public Policy · doi:10.1080/13501763.2017.1298658 · Cited by 200
Aerni, P. (2009) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2008.12.016 · Cited by 82
“Behavioral economists would refer to the non-selfishmotives found in ultimatum games (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004), and welfare economists (Brooks and Manza, 2007) would claim that social preferences are not related to self-interest but reflect a normative stance about how society should address…”
Background
Metadata
- Venue
- Choice Reviews Online
- Publisher
- American Library Association
- Published
- 2007-11-01
- Volume
- 45
- Issue
- 03
- Pages
- 45-1685-45-1685
- ISSN
- 0009-4978 (ISSN-L)
- 1523-8253
- OpenAlex
- W647660605
- Cited by
- 356
- References
- 0
- Type
- book review
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.