The More Closely We Are Watched, the Better We Behave?
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This chapter provides a brief survey of the economic literature on transparency. The conceptual tool used by economists is the principal-agent model, a game-theoretic setting in which transparency corresponds to the ability of the principal to observe what the agent does. Holmström (1979) provides a powerful and general rationale for full transparency. One can argue that the increase in accountability is not sufficient to offset other drawbacks such as the violation of privacy, the direct cost of disclosure, or the revelation of sensitive information. Alternatively, one can attack the link between transparency and accountability: it is not necessarily true that more disclosure makes the agent behave better. Holmström showed that, in a world of complete contracts, the more the principal knows about the agent, the better the agent behaves. Some objections to Holmström – the right to privacy, the direct cost of disclosure, the risk that hostile parties learn sensitive information – are perfectly valid, but they find limited application in politics, corporate governance, and other important areas.
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Citations
Cites
Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
Holmstrom, B. (1999) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00083 · Cited by 3,172
Cited by
THE NPM AGENDA: BACK TO THE FUTURE
Lapsley, I. (2008) · Financial Accountability & Management · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0408.2008.00444.x · Cited by 427
Understanding the Complex Dynamics of Transparency
Meijer, A. (2013) · Public Administration Review · doi:10.1111/puar.12032 · Cited by 426
Transparency in Algorithmic and Human Decision-Making: Is There a Double Standard?
Zerilli, J., Knott, A., Maclaurin, J., & Gavaghan, C. (2019) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-018-0330-6 · Cited by 420
“Transparency can thus be more than merely instrumental — the means to overturn an adverse determination, for example — and come to embody an end or democratic value in its own right, a B right to know ^ (Forssbæck and Oxelheim 2014; Lombrozo 2011; Heald 2006; Prat 2006).”
BackgroundThe Trouble with Transparency: A Critical Review of Openness in e‐Government
Bannister, F., & Connolly, R. (2011) · Policy & Internet · doi:10.2202/1944-2866.1076 · Cited by 368
de Fine Licht, K., & de Fine Licht, J. (2020) · AI & SOCIETY · doi:10.1007/s00146-020-00960-w · Cited by 334
“An obvious objection is that focusing on the provision of justifications might increase the likelihood of decision-makers engaging in a post-decision construction of arguments designed to look better than they actually are—a maneuver known as window-dressing (Prat 2006).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Prat, A.
- Venue
- Transparency: The Key to Better Governance?
- Publisher
- British Academy
- Published
- 2006-09-07
- OpenAlex
- W1488509877
- Cited by
- 92
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 2.69
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Prat, A. (2006). The More Closely We Are Watched, the Better We Behave? Transparency: The Key to Better Governance? https://doi.org/10.5871/bacad/9780197263839.003.0006
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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