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Cited by 2Sports Analytics and PerformanceDecision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsSports, Gender, and Society

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 21 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; none of the 9 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.

The Point Spread as a Reference Point: Evidence from the National Basketball Association

Open access
Diemer, George, Leeds, Michael·2022·Journal of Applied Sport Management

Abstract

A contentious literature surrounds the claim that heavy favorites’ failure to cover the point-spread in National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) basketball could indicate point-shaving. This paper extends the literature by using a new methodology to show that favorites in the National Basketball Association (NBA) also frequently fail to cover the spread. However, the high salaries in the NBA make point-shaving by players unlikely. Moreover, heavy underdogs also fail to cover the point spread and lose by more than expected. These seemingly anomalous findings are consistent with underdogs’ using the point-spread as a reference point.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

Using NBA regular-season point-spread and outcome data, the paper finds that heavy favorites fail to cover the spread more often than slight favorites, and heavy underdogs also lose by more than expected. The authors argue these patterns are more consistent with underdogs using the point spread as a reference point than with point-shaving, which they deem unlikely in the NBA because of high salaries.

Key findings

  • Heavy favorites (at least 14 points) were significantly less likely to cover than lesser favorites (13.5 points or less); the kernel density for heavy favorites peaks at NFP<0 while lesser favorites peak near NFP=0, and the test of equal densities yields p-value = 0 (n=984 heavy, n=25,755 lesser).
  • The paper rejects the null that NFP distributions are equal for heavy and slight favorites; it reports p-value close to zero / p=0 for the comparisons.
  • Heavy underdogs also fail to cover and lose by more than predicted at an unexpectedly high rate, a right-tail finding the authors say favorite-only explanations do not account for.
  • The authors conclude NBA point-shaving is unlikely because high salaries create prohibitively high disincentives, and propose reference points: underdogs may pursue a “moral victory” by beating the spread when winning is out of reach.

Methods

  • Data: NBA regular season games from 1993-1994 through 2018-2019, with point spreads and outcomes from NBA Odds and Scores on Kaggle; games without posted spreads and zero-point-spread games were omitted, leaving 26,739 regular season games (the text also reports N = 19,303 in one place).
  • Computed Net Favored Points (NFP) = favored team’s score − underdog team’s score + point spread, then estimated kernel densities of NFP for heavy vs slight favorites at thresholds such as 14 and 10 points.
  • Compared distributions using nonparametric/bootstrap tests of equality, with confidence bands, testing H0: f(NFP)=g(NFP) for all NFP against H1: f(NFP)≠g(NFP) for some NFP.

Limitations

  • Stated: the reference-point explanation for underdog risky strategies is not directly tested; the paper says “Whether this occurs in fact is the subject for further research.”
  • Evident: the analysis is observational and cannot directly distinguish point-shaving, coaching strategy, bettor bias, or reference-point behavior; the paper’s causal language about the point spread as a reference point is an interpretation of distributional patterns.
  • Evident: the sample omits games without posted spreads and zero-spread games, and the text reports inconsistent sample sizes (N = 19,303 vs. 26,739), which may affect generalizability.

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.7290/jasm14cbdg

Cites

21 of 21 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

0 Valid · 0 Not valid · 8 Not checked · 17 Own results and interpretations

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Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.

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Citations

Cites

Research works printed but not linked: 1

  1. Leeds, M., & von Allmen, P. (2010). The Economics of Sports. Boston: Pearson.

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Diemer, G., & Leeds, M.
Affiliations
Temple University (US)
Corresponding author
Leeds, Michael
Venue
Journal of Applied Sport Management
Published
2022
ISSN
  • 2327-0179 (ISSN-L)
  • 2327-0187
OpenAlex
W4312229842
Cited by
2
References
17
Citations by year
2025: 1 · 2024: 1
FWCI
0.37
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
Journal of applied sport management (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Sports Analytics and Performance
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Social Sciences › Gender Studies › Sports, Gender, and Society
Keywords
point spread, NBA basketball, underdog, favorites, sports betting, reference points, player salaries

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Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.