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Drugs, Violence, and State-Sponsored Protection Rackets in Mexico and Colombia
Abstract
Illegality does not necessarily breed violence. The relationship between illicit markets and violence depends on institutions of protection. When state-sponsored protection rackets form, illicit markets can be peaceful. Conversely, the breakdown of state-sponsored protection rackets, which may result from well-meaning policy reforms intended to reduce corruption and improve law enforcement, can lead to violence. The cases of drug trafficking in contemporary Mexico and Colombia show how a focus on the emergence and breakdown of state-sponsored protection rackets helps explain variation in levels of violence both within and across illicit markets.
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“De igual forma, durante la mayor parte del siglo XX en México las actividades del comercio de drogas ilegales fueron gestionadas mediante arreglos bajo el control y la protección estatal.”
From Tortura policial: más allá de “confesiones” para el sistema de justicia penal (2022) · cites this paper as Snyder, & Durán Martínez, 2009
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Research works printed but not linked: 15
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Cited by
Tortura policial: más allá de “confesiones” para el sistema de justicia penal
Silva Forné, C., & Padilla Oñate, S. (2022) · Estudios Sociológicos de El Colegio de México · doi:10.24201/es.2022v40n119.2121 · Cited by 6
Metadata
- Authors
- Snyder, R., & Durán Martínez, A.
- Venue
- Colombia Internacional
- Publisher
- Universidad de los Andes
- Published
- 2009-07-01
- Issue
- 70
- Pages
- 61-91
- ISSN
- 1900-6004
- 0121-5612
- Cited by
- 49
- References
- 0
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