Experienced Wholeness: Integrating Insights from Gestalt Theory, Cognitive Neuroscience, and Predictive Processing
Abstract
An interdisciplinary account of phenomenal unity, investigating how experiential wholes can be characterized and how such characterizations can be analyzed computationally. How can we account for phenomenal unity? That is, how can we characterize and explain our experience of objects and groups of objects, bodily experiences, successions of events, and the attentional structure of consciousness as wholes? In this book, Wanja Wiese develops an interdisciplinary account of phenomenal unity, investigating how experiential wholes can be characterized and how such characterization can be analyzed conceptually as well as computationally. Wiese first addresses how the unity of consciousness can be characterized phenomenologically, discussing what it is like to experience wholes and what is the experiential contribution of phenomenal unity. Considering the associated conceptual and empirical issues, he draws connections to phenomenological accounts and research on Gestalt theory. The results show how the attentional structure of experience, the experience of temporal flow, and different types of experiential wholes contribute to our sense of phenomenal unity. Moreover, characterizing phenomenal unity in terms of the existence of a single global phenomenal state is neither necessary nor sufficient to adequately address the problem of phenomenal unity. Wiese then suggests that the concepts and ideas of predictive processing can be used to analyze phenomenal unity computationally. The result is both a conceptual framework and an interdisciplinary account: the regularity account of phenomenal unity. According to this account, experienced wholes correspond to a hierarchy of connecting regularities. The brain tracks these regularities by hierarchical prediction error minimization, which approximates hierarchical Bayesian inference.
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Interoceptive experience does not specify a particular localizable entity because there is no concrete object of interoception to focus on.
“interoceptive experience does not specify a particular localizable entity in a way that allows further discovery by the attentive deployment of perception or theoretical inference, because there is no concrete (by which he means spatiotemporally located) object of interoception to focus on.”
From Pain Asymbolia as Depersonalization for Pain Experience. An Interoceptive Active Inference Account (2020) · cites this paper as Wiese (2018)
The apparent substantiality of the phenomenal self is explained by a structural feature of the salience model that binds different dimensions of salience by representations of higher-order dimensions of salience.
“the apparent substantiality of the phenomenal self is explained by a structural feature of this salience model: it binds different dimensions of salience by representations of higher-order dimensions of salience”
From Pain Asymbolia as Depersonalization for Pain Experience. An Interoceptive Active Inference Account (2020) · cites this paper as Wiese, 2018
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Cited by 35
- Authors
- Wiese, W.
- Corresponding author
- Wiese, Wanja
- ORCID
- Wiese, Wanja
- Venue
- The MIT Press eBooks
- Publisher
- The MIT Press
- Published
- 2018-01-05
- OpenAlex
- W4253475747
- Cited by
- 35
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 2 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 8 · 2021: 6 · 2020: 7 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 1
- FWCI
- 4.65
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The MIT Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy
- Keywords
- phenomenal unity, unity of consciousness, temporal flow, Gestalt theory, predictive processing, prediction error minimization, hierarchical Bayesian inference
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