Preventing Coups d’état

Abstract

This chapter discusses how the decision to prioritize coup prevention is a rational one. It explains that the threat of a coup is more immediate and unpredictable than the threat posed by civil war or international conflict. It describes a range of coup-proofing strategies that rulers adopt to hinder military effectiveness, reinforce ethnic and political divides, and drain financial resources. The chapter shows that counterbalancing the military with coercive institutions outside the regular military chain of command increases the risk that coup attempts will fail. It highlights that understanding how counterbalancing works can help predict where coup attempts will occur, whether they will succeed, and how violent they are likely to be. It points out that coups are the most common way dictatorships begin and end, and that even failed coup attempts can have deleterious effects. The chapter also talks about how rulers design their coercive institutions, and discusses how counterweights might help insulate rulers from successful coups, but weakens the state in a number of ways. It then states that the way rulers organize their coercive institutions affects the survival of their regimes. Finally, it discusses how coup plotters begin their efforts to seize power by recruiting potential supporters, and the potential costs to the perpetrators if the coup fails.