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Cited by 549Economic theories and modelsBanking stability, regulation, efficiencyLabor market dynamics and wage inequality

Incentive Effects of Terminations: Applications to the Credit and Labor Markets

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Stiglitz, Joseph E., Weiss, Andrew·1983·Columbia University
DOI 10.7916/d80k2kjv
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Abstract

Stiglitz and Weiss examine the incentive effects of terminations in terms of applications to the credit and labor markets.

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  • Ineffective corporate governance tends to impede the mobilization of savings from disparate individuals and the flow of savings to socially beneficial ends.

    “In turn, ineffective corporate governance tends to impede the mobilization of savings from disparate individuals and the flow of savings to socially beneficial ends”

    From Finance, Growth, and Inequality (2021) · cites this paper as Stiglitz and Weiss, 1983

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References 7 · Cited by 549

Authors
Stiglitz, J. E., & Weiss, A.
ORCID
Stiglitz, Joseph E.
Venue
Columbia University
Publisher
Columbia University
Published
1983
Volume
73
Issue
5
Pages
912-927
ISSN
0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.7916/d80k2kjv
OpenAlex
W1588174690
Cited by
549
References
7
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2025: 9 · 2024: 9 · 2023: 9 · 2022: 18 · 2021: 22 · 2020: 13 · 2019: 16 · 2018: 30 · 2017: 16 · 2016: 21 · 2015: 13 · 2014: 14 · 2013: 19 · 2012: 26
FWCI
36.97
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • American Economic Review (submittedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • Columbia Academic Commons (Columbia University)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic theories and models
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Banking stability, regulation, efficiency
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Labor market dynamics and wage inequality
Keywords
termination, incentive effects, credit markets, labor market, information asymmetry, adverse selection, moral hazard

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