Taxonomies for Reasoning About Cyber-physical Attacks in IoT-based Manufacturing Systems
Open accessAbstract
The Internet of Things (IoT) has transformed many aspects of modern manufacturing, from design to production to quality control. In particular, IoT and digital manufacturing technologies have substantially accelerated product development- cycles and manufacturers can now create products of a complexity and precision not heretofore possible. New threats to supply chain security have arisen from connecting machines to the Internet and introducing complex IoT-based systems controlling manufacturing processes. By attacking these IoT-based manufacturing systems and tampering with digital files, attackers can manipulate physical characteristics of parts and change the dimensions, shapes, or mechanical properties of the parts, which can result in parts that fail in the field. These defects increase manufacturing costs and allow silent problems to occur only under certain loads that can threaten safety and/or lives. To understand potential dangers and protect manufacturing system safety, this paper presents two taxonomies: one for classifying cyber-physical attacks against manufacturing processes and another for quality control measures for counteracting these attacks. We systematically identify and classify possible cyber-physical attacks and connect the attacks with variations in manufacturing processes and quality control measures. Our taxonomies also provide a scheme for linking emerging IoT-based manufacturing system vulnerabilities to possible attacks and quality control measures.
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As established by [35], the threats exposed in additive manufacturing stretch across digital manufacturing devices of all shapes and sizes.
“As it was established by [35], the threats exposed in additive manufacturing stretch across digital manufacturing devices of all shapes and sizes.”
From A Review of Cybersecurity Guidelines for Manufacturing Factories in Industry 4.0 (2021) · cites this paper as [35]
Cites
A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems
Zhu, B., Joseph, A., & Sastry, S. (2011) · 2011 International Conference on Internet of Things and 4th International Conference on Cyber, Physical and Social Computing · doi:10.1109/ithings/cpscom.2011.34 · Cited by 458 · cited 2× · see citing works
“Past IoT security research has explored cyber-vulnerabilities in industrial control systems, such as Supervisory Control and Data Acquisi tion (SCADA) controllers [6], which can force physical systems to operate outside of their safety tolerances.”
BackgroundMethodA taxonomy of network and computer attacks
Hansman, S., & Hunt, R. (2005) · Computers & Security · doi:10.1016/j.cose.2004.06.011 · Cited by 402 · see citing works
A defense-centric taxonomy based on attack manifestations
Killourhy, K. S., Maxion, R. A., & Tan, K. M. C. (2004) · International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks, 2004 · doi:10.1109/dsn.2004.1311881 · Cited by 64 · see citing works
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A survey of physics-based attack detection in cyber-physical systems
Giraldo, J., Urbina, D., Cardenas, A., Valente, J., Faisal, M., Ruths, J., Tippenhauer, N. O., Sandberg, H., & Candell, R. (2019) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3203245 · Cited by 535 · see citing works
Security and privacy in cyber-physical systems: A survey of surveys
Giraldo, J., Sarkar, E., Cardenas, A. A., Maniatakos, M., & Kantarcioglu, M. (2017) · IEEE Design & Test · doi:10.1109/mdat.2017.2709310 · Cited by 289 · see citing works
A Review of Cybersecurity Guidelines for Manufacturing Factories in Industry 4.0
Mullet, V., Sondi, P., & Ramat, E. (2021) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2021.3056650 · Cited by 161 · see citing works
“As it was established by [35], the threats exposed in additive manufacturing stretch across digital manufacturing devices of all shapes and sizes.”
Background
- Authors
- Pan, Y., White, J., Schmidt, D., Elhabashy, A., Sturm, L., Camelio, J., & Williams, C.
- Affiliations
- Vanderbilt University (US)
- Virginia Tech (US)
- Venue
- International Journal of Interactive Multimedia and Artificial Intelligence
- Published
- 2017-03-01
- Volume
- 4
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 45-54
- ISSN
- 1989-1660 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2517723570
- Cited by
- 81
- References
- 3
- Citations by year
- 2025: 8 · 2024: 9 · 2023: 8 · 2022: 7 · 2021: 15 · 2020: 12 · 2019: 9 · 2018: 7 · 2017: 6
- FWCI
- 9.96
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- diamond
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- Locations
- International Journal of Interactive Multimedia and Artificial Intelligence (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Re-Unir (International University of La Rioja) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering › Digital Transformation in Industry
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
- Keywords
- cyber-physical attacks, Internet of Things, attack taxonomy, quality control measures, supply chain security, attack classification, manufacturing safety, digital manufacturing
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