Effects of Individual Physician-Level and Practice-Level Financial Incentives on Hypertension Care: A Randomized Trial
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
IMPORTANCE: Pay for performance is intended to align incentives to promote high-quality care, but results have been contradictory. OBJECTIVE: To test the effect of explicit financial incentives to reward guideline-recommended hypertension care. DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS: Cluster randomized trial of 12 Veterans Affairs outpatient clinics with 5 performance periods and a 12-month washout that enrolled 83 primary care physicians and 42 nonphysician personnel (eg, nurses, pharmacists). INTERVENTIONS: Physician-level (individual) incentives, practice-level incentives, both, or none. Intervention participants received up to 5 payments every 4 months; all participants could access feedback reports. MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES: Among a random sample, number of patients achieving guideline-recommended blood pressure thresholds or receiving an appropriate response to uncontrolled blood pressure, number of patients prescribed guideline-recommended medications, and number who developed hypotension. RESULTS: Mean (SD) total payments over the study were $4270 ($459), $2672 ($153), and $1648 ($248) for the combined, individual, and practice-level interventions, respectively. The unadjusted baseline and final percentages and the adjusted absolute change over the study in patients meeting the combined blood pressure/appropriate response measure were 75% to 84% and 8.84% (95% CI, 4.20% to 11.80%) for the individual group, 80% to 85% and 3.70% (95% CI, 0.24% to 7.68%) for the practice-level group, 79% to 88% and 5.54% (95% CI, 1.92% to 9.52%) for the combined group, and 86% to 86% and 0.47% (95% CI, -3.12% to 4.04%) for the control group. The adjusted absolute estimated difference in the change between the proportion of patients with blood pressure control/appropriate response for individual incentive and control groups was 8.36% (95% CI, 2.40% to 13.00%; P=.005). The other incentive groups did not show a significant change compared with controls for this outcome. For medications, the unadjusted baseline and final percentages and the adjusted absolute change were 61% to 73% and 9.07% (95% CI, 4.52% to 13.44%), 56% to 65% and 4.98% (95% CI, 0.64% to 10.08%), 65% to 80% and 7.26% (95% CI, 2.92% to 12.48%), and 63% to 72% and 4.35% (95% CI, -0.28% to 9.28%), respectively. These changes in the use of guideline-recommended medications were not significant in any of the incentive groups compared with controls, nor was the incidence of hypotension. The effect of the incentive was not sustained after a washout. CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE: Individual financial incentives, but not practice-level or combined incentives, resulted in greater blood pressure control or appropriate response to uncontrolled blood pressure; none of the incentives resulted in greater use of guideline-recommended medications or increased incidence of hypotension compared with controls. Further research is needed on the factors that contributed to these findings. TRIAL REGISTRATION: clinicaltrials.gov Identifier: NCT00302718.
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Cites
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The effect of financial incentives on the quality of health care provided by primary care physicians
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“Then, the clinics were randomized to 1 of 4 study groups: (1) physicianlevel (individual) incentives; (2) practice-level incentives; (3) physician-level plus practice-level (combined) incentives; and (4) no incentives (control).”
MethodStatistical considerations in the design and analysis of community intervention trials
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Spending differences associated with the Medicare Physician Group Practice Demonstration
Colla, C. H., Wennberg, D. E., Meara, E., Skinner, J. S., Gottlieb, D., Lewis, V. A., Snyder, C. M., & Fisher, E. S. (2012) · JAMA · doi:10.1001/2012.jama.10812 · Cited by 163
Cited by
Whelton, P. K., Carey, R. M., Aronow, W. S., Casey, D. E., Collins, K. J., Dennison Himmelfarb, C., DePalma, S. M., Gidding, S., Jamerson, K. A., Jones, D. W., et al. (2018) · Hypertension · doi:10.1161/hyp.0000000000000065 · Cited by 7,391
Whelton, P. K., Carey, R. M., Aronow, W. S., Casey, D. E., Collins, K. J., Dennison Himmelfarb, C., DePalma, S. M., Gidding, S., Jamerson, K. A., Jones, D. W., et al. (2018) · Journal of the American College of Cardiology · doi:10.1016/j.jacc.2017.11.006 · Cited by 6,616
Whelton, P. K., Carey, R. M., Aronow, W. S., Casey, D. E., Collins, K. J., Dennison Himmelfarb, C., DePalma, S. M., Gidding, S., Jamerson, K. A., Jones, D. W., et al. (2018) · Hypertension · doi:10.1161/hyp.0000000000000066 · Cited by 4,347
Mancia, G., Kreutz, R., Brunström, M., Burnier, M., Grassi, G., Januszewicz, A., Muiesan, M. L., Tsioufis, K., Agabiti-Rosei, E., Algharably, E. A. E., et al. (2023) · Journal of Hypertension · doi:10.1097/hjh.0000000000003480 · Cited by 3,473
Whelton, P. K., Carey, R. M., Aronow, W. S., Casey, D. E., Collins, K. J., Dennison Himmelfarb, C., DePalma, S. M., Gidding, S., Jamerson, K. A., Jones, D. W., et al. (2018) · Circulation · doi:10.1161/cir.0000000000000596 · Cited by 1,127
Metadata
- Authors
- Petersen, L. A., Simpson, K., Pietz, K., Urech, T. H., Hysong, S. J., Profit, J., Conrad, D. A., Dudley, R. A., & Woodard, L. D.
- Venue
- JAMA
- Publisher
- American Medical Association (AMA)
- Published
- 2013-09-11
- Volume
- 310
- Issue
- 10
- Pages
- 1042
- ISSN
- 0002-9955 (ISSN-L)
- 0098-7484
- OpenAlex
- W2103295541
- Cited by
- 125
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 23.23
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- Petersen, L. A., Simpson, K., Pietz, K., Urech, T. H., Hysong, S. J., Profit, J., Conrad, D. A., Dudley, R. A., & Woodard, L. D. (2013). Effects of Individual Physician-Level and Practice-Level Financial Incentives on Hypertension Care: A Randomized Trial. JAMA. https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2013.276303
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