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Cited by 291Misinformation and Its ImpactsParanormal Experiences and BeliefsDecision-Making and Behavioral Economics

Belief in Conspiracy Theories and Susceptibility to the Conjunction Fallacy

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Brotherton, Robert, French, Christopher C.·2014·Applied Cognitive Psychology
DOI 10.1002/acp.2995
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Abstract

Summary: People who believe in the paranormal have been found to be particularly susceptible to the conjunction fallacy. The present research examines whether the same is true of people who endorse conspiracy theories. Two studies examined the association between conspiracist ideation and the number of conjunction violations made in a variety of contexts (neutral, paranormal and conspiracy). Study 1 found that participants who endorsed a range of popular conspiracy theories more strongly also made more conjunction errors than participants with weaker conspiracism, regardless of the contextual framing of the conjunction. Study 2, using an independent sample and a generic measure of conspiracist ideation, replicated the finding that conspiracy belief is associated with domain‐general susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy. The findings are discussed in relation to the association between conspiracism and other anomalous beliefs, the representativeness heuristic and the tendency to infer underlying causal relationships connecting ostensibly unrelated events. © 2014 The Authors. Applied Cognitive Psychology Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

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  • Conspiracy belief is associated with the tendency to overestimate the likelihood of co-occurring events.

    “It is also associated with the tendency to overestimate the likelihood of co-occurring events (Brotherton & French, 2014)”

    From The Psychology of Conspiracy Theories (2017) · cites this paper as Brotherton & French, 2014

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Authors
Brotherton, R., & French, C. C.
Affiliations
University of London (GB)
Corresponding author
Brotherton, Robert
ORCID
French, Christopher C.
Venue
Applied Cognitive Psychology
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2014-01-15
Volume
28
Issue
2
Pages
238-248
ISSN
  • 0888-4080 (ISSN-L)
  • 1099-0720
DOI
10.1002/acp.2995
OpenAlex
W2099432003
Cited by
291
References
71
Citations by year
2026: 31 · 2025: 28 · 2024: 18 · 2023: 23 · 2022: 43 · 2021: 18 · 2020: 19 · 2019: 19 · 2018: 48 · 2017: 19 · 2016: 11 · 2015: 10 · 2014: 3 · 2013: 1
FWCI
46.71
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Applied Cognitive Psychology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Goldsmiths (University of London) (acceptedVersion)
Funders
Economic and Social Research Council (ES/I90249X)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Misinformation and Its Impacts
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Paranormal Experiences and Beliefs
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
Keywords
conspiracy theories, conspiracist ideation, conjunction fallacy, supernatural beliefs, representativeness heuristic, causal inference, cognitive biases

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