The Psychology of Conspiracy Theories
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 43 of the 43 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 14 of the 45 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Abstract
, which explain important events as secret plots by powerful and malevolent groups? What are the psychological consequences of adopting these theories? We review the current research and find that it answers the first of these questions more thoroughly than the second. Belief in conspiracy theories appears to be driven by motives that can be characterized as epistemic (understanding one's environment), existential (being safe and in control of one's environment), and social (maintaining a positive image of the self and the social group). However, little research has investigated the consequences of conspiracy belief, and to date, this research does not indicate that conspiracy belief fulfills people's motivations. Instead, for many people, conspiracy belief may be more appealing than satisfying. Further research is needed to determine for whom, and under what conditions, conspiracy theories may satisfy key psychological motives.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
This review argues that belief in conspiracy theories is driven by epistemic, existential, and social motives, but current evidence suggests such beliefs often fail to satisfy those motives and may be self-defeating. It calls for more research on the consequences of conspiracy belief, especially among disadvantaged or threatened populations.
Key findings
- Conspiracy belief is associated with epistemic motives: it is stronger when pattern-seeking is experimentally heightened, among people who habitually seek meaning and patterns, when events are large-scale or lack clear official explanations, and when people feel uncertain or distressed; it is also correlated with lower analytic thinking, lower education, conjunction-fallacy tendencies, and hypersensitive agency detection.
- Existential motives are supported: conspiracy belief is linked to anxiety, powerlessness, lack of sociopolitical control or psychological empowerment, and is heightened when people feel unable to control outcomes and reduced when control is affirmed.
- Social motives are supported: conspiracy belief is linked to ostracism, low ethnic or income status, losing political side, prejudice against powerful groups, narcissism, and collective narcissism.
- Consequences appear negative in the reviewed experiments: exposure to conspiracy theories increases uncertainty, suppresses autonomy and control, reduces organizational commitment and mainstream political engagement such as voting and party politics, decreases trust in governmental institutions, and causes disenchantment with politicians and scientists. The paper also cites polling data that over a third of Americans believe global warming is a hoax and over half believe Lee Harvey Oswald did not act alone in the JFK assassination.
Methods
- Design: narrative review of current psychological research on conspiracy theories, organizing motives into epistemic, existential, and social categories derived from system-justification theory.
- Data or sample: no new data; synthesizes prior correlational and experimental studies, including experiments with undergraduate students and survey panelists.
- Main analysis: thematic synthesis of evidence on antecedents and consequences of conspiracy belief; no systematic search or meta-analysis is reported.
Limitations
- The paper states that little research has investigated the consequences of conspiracy belief, and that research to date does not indicate conspiracy belief fulfills people’s motivations.
- The paper states that experimental research has sampled undergraduate students and survey panelists who are not particularly disadvantaged or threatened and generally do not endorse conspiracy theories; it calls for controlled longitudinal and experimental investigations of disadvantaged and threatened populations.
- Evident from the text: as a narrative review, it does not report a systematic search strategy, quality appraisal, or meta-analytic synthesis, so its conclusions about consequences are preliminary.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
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Cites
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Claims the paper makes
12 Valid · 1 Not valid · 27 Not checked · 20 Own results and interpretations
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“It is also associated with the tendency to overestimate the likelihood of co-occurring events (Brotherton & French, 2014)”
§ The Psychology of Conspiracy Theories > Epistemic Motives
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Brotherton & French, 2014 source
The Summary and conclusions states that people often judge the co-occurrence of events as more likely than either event alone, and that stronger endorsement of conspiracy theories is associated with greater susceptibility to this conjunction fallacy. The Discussion likewise reports that stronger conspiracist ideation was associated with more conjunction-fallacy errors. The citing sentence describes an association, not a causal effect. (LLM, conf=0.94)
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“and lower levels of education (Douglas, Sutton, Callan, Dawtry, & Harvey, 2016).”
§ The Psychology of Conspiracy Theories > Epistemic Motives
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Douglas, Sutton, Callan, Dawtry, & Harvey, 2016 source
The General Discussion reports that people with lower levels of education were more likely to endorse conspiracy theories in Study 1 and that Study 2 replicated the finding. A note in the paper (p. 23) reports a significant negative correlation across the two studies (r = −.21). (LLM, conf=0.95)
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“Conspiracy belief is correlated with lower levels of analytic thinking (Swami, Voracek, Stieger, Tran, & Furnham, 2014)”
§ The Psychology of Conspiracy Theories > Epistemic Motives
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Swami, Voracek, Stieger, Tran, & Furnham, 2014 source
The Study 1 Results and discussion state that stronger belief in conspiracy theories was associated with a lesser tendency to rely on deliberative, analytic processing. This directly supports the claimed correlation. (LLM, conf=0.94)
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“It is also stronger among people who habitually seek meaning and patterns in the environment, including believers in paranormal phenomena (e.g., Bruder, Haffke, Neave, Nouripanah, & Imhoff, 2013; but see Dieguez, Wagner-Egger, & Gauvrit, 2015).”
§ The Psychology of Conspiracy Theories > Epistemic Motives
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Bruder, Haffke, Neave, Nouripanah, & Imhoff, 2013 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Study 2 Results report a positive association between conspiracy mentality and paranormal belief, and Study 4 Results report an association with anthropomorphism. The Study 4 Summary suggests that anthropomorphism and conspiratorial thinking both attribute agency where there may be none. The paper does not establish the broader claim that people who habitually seek meaning and patterns in the environment have stronger conspiracy beliefs. (LLM, conf=0.86)
- Supportedcites Dieguez, Wagner-Egger, & Gauvrit, 2015 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The citing sentence attributes the positive association primarily to Bruder et al. (2013); its “but see” citation presents Dieguez, Wagner-Egger, and Gauvrit (2015) as a qualification, not as support for that association. The cited paper’s title explicitly says that a low prior for randomness does not explain conspiracy belief. A snippet from “Understanding Conspiracy Theories” (score 0.668) likewise cites Dieguez et al. as a “but see” counterpoint to a pattern-perception claim. No paper-scoped full-text snippets were available, so this confirms the citation’s contrasting role rather than the citing sentence’s every detail. (LLM, conf=0.76)
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“and resistant to falsification in that they postulate that conspirators use stealth and disinformation to cover up their actions—implying that people who try to debunk conspiracy theories may, themselves, be part of the conspiracy (Lewandowsky et al., 2015).”
§ The Psychology of Conspiracy Theories > Epistemic Motives
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Lewandowsky et al., 2015 source
The Conspiracist Classification Criteria section (page not supplied) describes suspicion of hidden agendas and deception, and says contrary evidence can be recast as evidence that more people or institutions are involved in a conspiracy. Its example of exonerating investigations being called a “whitewash” supports the point that attempts to debunk a theory may themselves be treated as part of the cover-up. (LLM, conf=0.87)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
44 more claims · 6 with their cited sources checked
Create a free account to see all 60 claims and every source verdict.
- It may state two separate claims as one. 8
- Probably not a substantial claim. 5
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“people are likely most allured by conspiracy theories and movements that promise to fulfill the highest number of relevant needs at the same time [see 30].”
From The dark side of social movements: social identity, non-conformity, and the lure of conspiracy theories (2020) · cites this paper as [30]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe cited source says what the claim attributes to it.
In the citing paper
“The “tight beliefs” or rigid interpretations may be linked to conspiracy thinking [58] and may attain a form of delusional ideation [44].”
From Impact of Media-Induced Uncertainty on Mental Health: Narrative-Based Perspective. (2025) · cites this paper as [58]
The check wasn’t confident either way, so it gives no verdict — never disputed.
In the citing paper
“Misinformation and propaganda have been linked to increased polarization and cognitive rigidity [58]”
From Impact of Media-Induced Uncertainty on Mental Health: Narrative-Based Perspective. (2025) · cites this paper as [58]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredIn the citing paper
“Various psychological needs may draw people to conspiracy theories, primarily because their qualities promise [see 30] to meet these needs.”
From The dark side of social movements: social identity, non-conformity, and the lure of conspiracy theories (2020) · cites this paper as [30]
Citations
Cites
The psychology of interpersonal relations.
Heider, F. (1958) · doi:10.1037/10628-000 · Cited by 13,457
The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations.
Newcomb, T., & Heider, F. (1958) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2089062 · Cited by 11,822 · cited 1×
“Finding causal explanations for events is a core part of building up a stable, accurate, and internally consistent understanding of the world (Heider, 1958).”
BackgroundThe Effects of Anti-Vaccine Conspiracy Theories on Vaccination Intentions
Jolley, D., & Douglas, K. M. (2014) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0089177 · Cited by 1,232 · cited 3×
“It also causes disenchantment with politicians and scientists ( Jolley & Douglas, 2014a).”
BackgroundSelf-citationLacking control increases illusory pattern perception
Whitson, J. A., & Galinsky, A. D. (2008) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1159845 · Cited by 1,119 · cited 1×
“In keeping with this analysis, research suggests that belief in conspiracy theories is stronger when the motivation to find patterns in the environment is experimentally heightened (Whitson & Galinsky, 2008).”
ResultGoertzel, T. (1994) · Political Psychology · doi:10.2307/3791630 · Cited by 1,094 · cited 2×
“These are examples of conspiracy theories—explanations for important events that involve secret plots by powerful and malevolent groups (e.g., Goertzel, 1994).”
BackgroundBruder, M., Haffke, P., Neave, N., Nouripanah, N., & Imhoff, R. (2013) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00225 · Cited by 1,049 · cited 1×
“Other research indicates that conspiracy belief is strongly related to lack of sociopolitical control or lack of psychological empowerment (Bruder et al., 2013).”
BackgroundUscinski, J. E., & Parent, J. M. (2014) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199351800.001.0001 · Cited by 939
Speaking (Un–)Truth to Power: Conspiracy Mentality as A Generalised Political Attitude
Imhoff, R., & Bruder, M. (2014) · European Journal of Personality · doi:10.1002/per.1930 · Cited by 831 · cited 1×
“Conspiracy belief has also been linked to prejudice against powerful groups (Imhoff & Bruder, 2014) and those perceived as enemies (Kofta & Sedek, 2005).”
BackgroundAnalytic thinking reduces belief in conspiracy theories
Swami, V., Voracek, M., Stieger, S., Tran, U. S., & Furnham, A. (2014) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2014.08.006 · Cited by 726
Jolley, D., & Douglas, K. M. (2014) · British Journal of Psychology · doi:10.1111/bjop.12018 · Cited by 685 · cited 3×
“It also causes disenchantment with politicians and scientists ( Jolley & Douglas, 2014a).”
BackgroundSelf-citation
Research works printed but not linked: 1
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199351800.001.0001 · DOI · Paper page
Cited by
Using social and behavioural science to support COVID-19 pandemic response
Bavel, J. J. V., Baicker, K., Boggio, P. S., Capraro, V., Cichocka, A., Cikara, M., Crockett, M. J., Crum, A. J., Douglas, K. M., Druckman, J. N., et al. (2020) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-020-0884-z · Cited by 4,964
Self-citationUnderstanding Conspiracy Theories
Douglas, K. M., Uscinski, J. E., Sutton, R. M., Cichocka, A., Nefes, T., Ang, C. S., & Deravi, F. (2019) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/pops.12568 · Cited by 1,511
“According to Douglas, Sutton, and Cichocka (2017), people appear to be drawn to conspiracy theories when—compared to nonconspiracy explanations—they promise to satisfy important social psychological motives that can be characterized as epistemic (e.g., the desire for understanding, accuracy, and…”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationImhoff, R., & Lamberty, P. (2020) · Social Psychological and Personality Science · doi:10.1177/1948550620934692 · Cited by 722
“When people are not able to gain control in the real world, they compensate for this lack by perceiving patterns—even if they are an illusion (e.g., Douglas et al., 2017).”
BackgroundToward effective government communication strategies in the era of COVID-19
Hyland-Wood, B., Gardner, J., Leask, J., & Ecker, U. K. H. (2021) · Humanities and Social Sciences Communications · doi:10.1057/s41599-020-00701-w · Cited by 488
Belief in conspiracy theories: Basic principles of an emerging research domain
van Prooijen, J., & Douglas, K. M. (2018) · European Journal of Social Psychology · doi:10.1002/ejsp.2530 · Cited by 483
“This line of reasoning is consistent with the observation that conspiracy theories gain momentum in the context of anxiety-provoking societal crisis events such as terrorism, natural disasters, or war (Van Prooijen & Douglas, 2017).”
BackgroundResultInfluentialSelf-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Douglas, K. M., Sutton, R. M., & Cichocka, A.
- Affiliations
- University of Kent (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Douglas, Karen M.
- Venue
- Current Directions in Psychological Science
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2017-12
- Volume
- 26
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 538-542
- ISSN
- 0963-7214 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-8721
- PMC
- PMC5724570
- OpenAlex
- W2731369199
- Cited by
- 1,316
- References
- 43
- Citations by year
- 2026: 171 · 2025: 169 · 2024: 176 · 2023: 160 · 2022: 258 · 2021: 194 · 2020: 106 · 2019: 53 · 2018: 26 · 2017: 2
- FWCI
- 130.61
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- journals.sagepub.com/page/policies/text-and-data-mining-license (tdm)
- Locations
- Current Directions in Psychological Science (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Kent Academic Repository (University of Kent) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Economic and Social Research Council (ES/N009614/1)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Misinformation and Its Impacts
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Paranormal Experiences and Beliefs
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social and Intergroup Psychology
- Keywords
- conspiracy theories, conspiracy beliefs, psychological motives, epistemic motivation, existential motivation, social motivation, self-image, social group identity, perceived control
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