A decade of theory of mind research on cayo santiago: Insights into rhesus macaque social cognition
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Over the past several decades, researchers have become increasingly interested in understanding how primates understand the behavior of others. One open question concerns whether nonhuman primates think about others’ behavior in psychological terms, that is, whether they have a theory of mind. Over the last ten years, experiments conducted on the free‐ranging rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) living on Cayo Santiago have provided important insights into this question. In this review, we highlight what we think are some of the most exciting results of this body of work. Specifically we describe experiments suggesting that rhesus monkeys may understand some psychological states, such as what others see, hear, and know, but that they fail to demonstrate an understanding of others’ beliefs. Thus, while some aspects of theory of mind may be shared between humans and other primates, others capacities are likely to be uniquely human. We also discuss some of the broader debates surrounding comparative theory of mind research, as well as what we think may be productive lines for future research with the rhesus macaques of Cayo Santiago. Am. J. Primatol. 78:106–116, 2016. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Meta-Analysis of Theory-of-Mind Development: The Truth about False Belief
Wellman, H. M., Cross, D., & Watson, J. (2001) · Child Development · doi:10.1111/1467-8624.00304 · Cited by 4,476
Do 15-month-old infants understand false beliefs?
Onishi, K. H., & Baillargeon, R. (2005) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1107621 · Cited by 2,350
The extreme male brain theory of autism
Baron-Cohen, S. (2002) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(02)01904-6 · Cited by 2,007 · cited 1×
“Humans, for example, are known to exhibit sex differences in mentalizing [e.g., Baron-Cohen, 2002], but it is unclear whether similar variance characterizes the performance of other primates [although see Hermann et al., 2007].”
BackgroundDoes the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? 30 years later
Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2008) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2008.02.010 · Cited by 1,592
Social evaluation by preverbal infants
Hamlin, J. K., Wynn, K., & Bloom, P. (2007) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature06288 · Cited by 1,566 · cited 2×
“To date, hundreds of published studies have used the looking time method to test physical and social knowledge in both human infant [e.g., Hamlin et al., 2007; Kovács et al., 2010 ; Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Saxe et al., 2005; Wynn, 1992] and animal participants [e.g., Rochatetal.,…”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialTomasello, M., & Call, J. (1997) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780195106237.001.0001 · Cited by 1,491
The Chimpanzees of the Taï Forest: Behavioural Ecology and Evolution
Boesch, C., & Boesch-Achermann, H. (2000) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198505082.001.0001 · Cited by 1,079
Beliefs about beliefs [P&W, SR&B]
Dennett, D. C. (1978) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00076664 · Cited by 609 · cited 2×
“Primates’ inability to represent others’ beliefs is significant because an important feature of beliefs is they can be incongruent with the actual state of the world—that is, they can be false [e.g. Dennett, 1978; Pylyshyn, 1978].”
BackgroundChimpanzees understand psychological states – the question is which ones and to what extent
Tomasello, M., Call, J., & Hare, B. (2003) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(03)00035-4 · Cited by 573
BOUNDARY PATROLS AND INTERGROUP ENCOUNTERS IN WILD CHIMPANZEES
Watts, D., & Mitani, J. (2001) · Behaviour · doi:10.1163/15685390152032488 · Cited by 393 · cited 1×
“For instance, male chimpanzees may avoid making noise when patrolling their borders or hunting formonkeys [Boesch & Boesch-Achermann, 2000; Watts & Mitani, 2001], and females primates sometimes do not produce copulation calls when mating with a subordinate male in the vicinity of a more dominant…”
Background(2011) · doi:10.4324/9780203833926 · Cited by 249
Genetic origins of social networks in rhesus macaques
Brent, L. J. N., Heilbronner, S. R., Horvath, J. E., Gonzalez-Martinez, J., Ruiz-Lambides, A., Robinson, A. G., Skene, J. H. P., & Platt, M. L. (2013) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep01042 · Cited by 220
Secret Agents: Inferences About Hidden Causes by 10- and 12-Month-Old Infants
Saxe, R., Tenenbaum, J. B., & Carey, S. (2005) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2005.01649.x · Cited by 210
Cited by
The sense of should: A biologically-based framework for modeling social pressure
Theriault, J. E., Young, L., & Barrett, L. F. (2021) · Physics of Life Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.plrev.2020.01.004 · Cited by 201
Theory of mind in animals: current and future directions
Krupenye, C., & Call, J. (2019) · WIREs Cognitive Science · doi:10.1002/wcs.1503 · Cited by 180
(2019) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198843702.001.0001 · Cited by 138
Metadata
- Authors
- Drayton, L. A., & Santos, L. R.
- Venue
- American Journal of Primatology
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2014-12-29
- Volume
- 78
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 106-116
- ISSN
- 0275-2565 (ISSN-L)
- 1098-2345
- OpenAlex
- W2146512607
- Cited by
- 60
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 5.72
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.