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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 28 of the 28 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; none of the 3 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.

Do 15-Month-Old Infants Understand False Beliefs?

Open access
Onishi, Kristine H., Baillargeon, Renée·2005·Science

Abstract

For more than two decades, researchers have argued that young children do not understand mental states such as beliefs. Part of the evidence for this claim comes from preschoolers' failure at verbal tasks that require the understanding that others may hold false beliefs. Here, we used a novel nonverbal task to examine 15-month-old infants' ability to predict an actor's behavior on the basis of her true or false belief about a toy's hiding place. Results were positive, supporting the view that, from a young age, children appeal to mental states—goals, perceptions, and beliefs—to explain the behavior of others.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

In a nonverbal violation-of-expectation task, 15-month-old infants looked longer when an actor searched for a hidden toy in a location inconsistent with her true or false belief about where it was. The authors conclude that infants already possess at least a rudimentary, implicit representational theory of mind.

Key findings

  • The predicted interaction between the actor’s belief about the toy’s location and the actor’s search action was reliable, \(F(1, 48) = 31.24\), \(P < 0.0001\).
  • The interaction was also reliable within the true-belief condition, \(F(1, 24) = 14.49\), \(P < 0.0008\), and within the false-belief condition, \(F(1, 24) = 16.69\), \(P < 0.0004\).
  • In each of the four belief conditions, infants looked reliably longer when the actor searched where she did not believe the toy to be hidden (all \(F > 5.34\), \(P < 0.05\)).
  • The authors argue these results suggest 15-month-olds expect an actor to search based on her belief, “rightly or wrongly,” and call into question the notion that preschoolers undergo a fundamental change from a nonrepresentational to a representational theory of mind.

Methods

  • Participants were 56 healthy-term infants, 27 female and 29 male, mean age 15 months, 7 days (range: 14 months, 27 days to 15 months, 18 days). Seven infants were randomly assigned to each of eight groups formed by crossing actor’s belief about the toy’s location (green or yellow box), belief status (true or false), and actor’s search location during test (green or yellow box). Another 14 infants were tested but eliminated.
  • Infants received three familiarization trials in which an actor hid a toy in a green box, then a single belief-induction trial with four versions yielding two true-belief and two false-belief conditions, followed by a single test trial in which the actor reached into either the green or yellow box.
  • Looking times during the test trial were compared using an analysis of variance with actor’s belief about the toy’s location, belief status, and actor’s action as between-subject factors, plus planned comparisons.

Limitations

  • The paper explicitly considers an alternative interpretation: infants might use a superficial expectation that a person looking for an object will search where she last saw it disappear, which would require tracking the actor’s perceptions but not attributing a belief to her. The authors prefer the belief interpretation but acknowledge this alternative.
  • The paper describes the infants’ understanding as “at least in a rudimentary and implicit form,” indicating that the findings do not establish explicit or verbal false-belief understanding.
  • Evident from the text: the sample was small, with only seven infants per group; the study tested only one narrow age range; and the dependent measure was infant looking time in a violation-of-expectation paradigm, which does not directly assess verbal report or later behavior.

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1126/science.1107621

Cites

28 of 28 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

3 tests recomputed · 0 with the reported and recomputed p on opposite sides of .05

Verification

Claims the paper makes

0 Valid · 0 Not valid · 2 Not checked · 15 Own results and interpretations

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Statistics that don’t add up

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1 of 1

Statistics recomputed

Every reported test result, recomputed from its test statistic and degrees of freedom. A result shows as not adding up only once an independent check has confirmed it.

  • Doesn’t add upF(1, 24) = 14.49reported p < .0008 · recomputed p < .001

    “F(1, 24) = 14.49, p < .0008”

  • Not confirmedF(1, 24) = 16.69reported p < .0004 · recomputed p < .001

    “F(1, 24) = 16.69, p < .0004”

  • ConsistentF(1, 48) = 31.24reported p < .0001 · recomputed p < .001

    “F(1, 48) = 31.24, p < .0001”

3 of 3

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Citations

Cites

Show all 28 references

Research works printed but not linked: 3

  1. A. Gopnik, H. M. Wellman, in Domain Specificity in Cognition and Culture, L. Hirschfeld, S. Gelman, Eds. (Cambridge Univ. Press, New York, 1994), pp. 257-293.
  2. D. Premack, A. J. Premack, in The Cognitive Neurosciences, M. S. Gazzaniga, Ed. (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1995), pp. 205-218.
  3. K. H. Onishi R. Baillargeon paper presented at the International Conference on Infant Studies Chicago IL 6 to 10 May 2004.

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Onishi, K. H., & Baillargeon, R.
Affiliations
  • University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign (US)
  • Department of Psychology, McGill University, Montreal, Quebec H3A 1B1, Canada.
Venue
Science
Published
2005-04-08
Volume
308
Issue
5719
Pages
255-258
ISSN
  • 0036-8075 (ISSN-L)
  • 1095-9203
OpenAlex
W1974955132
Cited by
2,350
References
28
Citations by year
2026: 53 · 2025: 73 · 2024: 123 · 2023: 82 · 2022: 162 · 2021: 143 · 2020: 143 · 2019: 189 · 2018: 184 · 2017: 107 · 2016: 159 · 2015: 139 · 2014: 131 · 2013: 118 · 2012: 111
FWCI
86.19
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Science (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (acceptedVersion)
  • PubMed Central (acceptedVersion)
Funders
  • National Institute of Mental Health (T32MH019990)
  • Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (R01HD021104, HD 21104)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Social Robot Interaction and HRI
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Language Development and Disorders
Keywords
false belief understanding, theory of mind, infant cognition, hidden object task, social cognition development
MeSH terms
Behavior, Child Development, Psychology, Child, Female, Humans, Infant, Male, Mental Processes, Psychology, Social, Comprehension

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Do 15-Month-Old Infants Understand False Beliefs? https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1126/science.1107621
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Onishi, K. H., & Baillargeon, R. (2005). Do 15-Month-Old Infants Understand False Beliefs? Science. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1107621

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