Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.
Cited by 370

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Collective action as an agreeable n-prisoners' dilemma

Hardin, Russell·1971·Behavioral Science

Abstract

The problem of collective action to produce a group collective good is analyzed as the game of Individual vs. Collective and then as an n-person game to show that, under the constraints of Mancur Olson's analysis, it is an n-prisoners' dilemma in the cases of latent and intermediate groups. The usual analysis according to which noncooperation is considered the rational strategy for classical 2-prisoners' dilemma is logically similar to Olson's analysis, which suggests that rational members of a latent group should not contribute toward the purchase of the group collective good. However, in the game analysis it is clear that the latent and intermediate groups are not logically different, but rather are distinguishable only statistically. Some prisoners' dilemma experimental results are used to suggest how the difference might arise and how the vast prisoners' dilemma literature can be related to the problem of collective action. The game of collective action is then analyzed not from the view of strategies but of outcomes. There is presented a theorem which states that the outcome in which all player-members of a group pay and all benefit is a Condorcet choice from the set of realizable outcomes for the game. Hence the cooperative outcome in such a game would prevail in election against all other outcomes.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1002/bs.3830160507

Cites

3 of 3 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cites

Show all 3 references

Cited by

See all 370

Metadata

Authors
Hardin, R.
Venue
Behavioral Science
Publisher
Wiley
Published
1971-09
Volume
16
Issue
5
Pages
472-481
ISSN
  • 1092-7026 (ISSN-L)
  • 0005-7940
  • 1099-1743
OpenAlex
W2094124914
Cited by
370
References
3
FWCI
15.15
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Collective action as an agreeable n-prisoners' dilemma. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1002/bs.3830160507
The paper
Hardin, R. (1971). Collective action as an agreeable n-prisoners' dilemma. Behavioral Science. https://doi.org/10.1002/bs.3830160507

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.