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The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, With a New Preface and Appendix

Olson, Mancur · 1965 · Harvard University Press eBooks

The DOI matches its Crossref record.

Abstract

Olson develops a theory of group and organizational behavior that cuts across disciplinary lines and illustrates the theory with empirical and historical studies of particular organizations, examining the extent to which individuals who share a common interest find it in their individual interest to bear the costs of the organizational effort.

Overview

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Crossref · 10.4159/9780674041660

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Metadata

Authors
Olson, M.
Corresponding author
Olson, Mancur
Venue
Harvard University Press eBooks
Published
1965-12-31
OpenAlex
W4391965190
Cited by
14,191
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 526 · 2025: 489 · 2024: 428 · 2023: 473 · 2022: 428 · 2021: 504 · 2020: 681 · 2019: 643 · 2018: 531 · 2017: 528 · 2016: 464 · 2015: 440 · 2014: 430 · 2013: 420 · 2012: 410
FWCI
28.30
Type
book
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Harvard University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Theory and Institutions
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
Keywords
collective action, group behavior, organizational behavior, free-riding, cost sharing, common interests, individual versus group interests

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, With a New Preface and Appendix. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.4159/9780674041660
The paper
Olson, M. (1965). The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, With a New Preface and Appendix. Harvard University Press eBooks. https://doi.org/10.4159/9780674041660

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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.