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Expected utility and approval voting

Fishburn, Peter C., Brams, Steven J. · 1981 · Behavioral Science

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Approval voting is concerned with the decision behavior of organizations and societal systems. As with other voting procedures, it elicits and converts input from voters into a social decision. Under approval voting, each voter in a multicandidate election can vote for as many candidates as he wishes. The candidate with the most votes is elected. Approval voting is analyzed here from the viewpoint of expected utility maximizing voters. Approximately optimal voting strategies are developed. The relative abilities of votes for different numbers of candidates to affect the outcome are assessed, and the issue of equity among voters is addressed. It is argued that approval voting is more equitable than the common plurality voting system.

Overview

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Registry

Crossref · 10.1002/bs.3830260206

Cites

11 of 11 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Citations

Cites

Show all 11 references

Research works printed but not linked: 2

  1. Comparison voting. Washington, D.C.: The American Political Science Association, 1978.
  2. Merrill, 1979, Mathematics Magazine, 52, 98

Cited by

Metadata

Authors
Fishburn, P. C., & Brams, S. J.
Affiliations
New York University (US)
Venue
Behavioral Science
Publisher
Wiley
Published
1981-04
Volume
26
Issue
2
Pages
136-142
ISSN
  • 1092-7026 (ISSN-L)
  • 0005-7940
  • 1099-1743
OpenAlex
W2039914285
Cited by
20
References
12
Citations by year
2015: 2 · 2014: 1
FWCI
15.15
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
doi.wiley.com/10.1002/tdm_license_1.1 (tdm, 12571 d)
Locations
Systems Research and Behavioral Science (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting
Keywords
approval voting, expected utility, voting strategy, multi-candidate elections, plurality voting, social decision-making

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Data sources

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Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.