The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Social Choice Scoring Functions
Abstract
Let a committee of voters be considering a finite set $A = \{ {a_1 ,a_2 , \cdots ,a_m } \}$ of alternatives for election. Each voter is assumed to rank the alternatives according to his preferences in a strict linear order. A social choice function is a rule which, to every finite committee of voters with specified preference orders, assigns a nonempty subset of A, interpreted as the set of “winners”. A social choice function is consistent if, whenever two disjoint committees meeting separately choose the same winner(s), then the committees meeting jointly choose precisely these winner(s). The function is symmetric if it does not depend on the names of the various voters and the various alternatives. It is shown that every symmetric, consistent social choice function is obtained (except for ties) in the following way: there is a sequence $s_1 ,s_2 , \cdots $, $s_m $ of m real numbers such that if every voter gives score $s_i $ to his ith most preferred alternative, then the alternative with highest score (summed over all voters) is the winner.
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Citations
Cites
Rockafellar, R. T. (1970) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400873173 · Cited by 10,801
The Theory of Committees and Elections.
Stuart, A., & Black, D. (1959) · Economica · doi:10.2307/2550498 · Cited by 2,822
A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
May, K. O. (1952) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1907651 · Cited by 1,555
Social Choice and Individual Values.
Goodman, L. A., & Arrow, K. J. (1953) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2087870 · Cited by 1,534
Fishburn, P. C. (2015) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400868339 · Cited by 700
Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
Smith, J. H. (1973) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914033 · Cited by 494
Cited by
Myerson, R. B., & Weber, R. J. (1993) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2938959 · Cited by 466
A Consistent Extension of Condorcet’s Election Principle
Young, H. P., & Levenglick, A. (1978) · SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics · doi:10.1137/0135023 · Cited by 455
Self-citationA Theory of Case-Based Decisions
Gilboa, I., & Schmeidler, D. (2001) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511493539 · Cited by 383
Expected utility and approval voting
Fishburn, P. C., & Brams, S. J. (1981) · Behavioral Science · doi:10.1002/bs.3830260206 · Cited by 20
Metadata
- Authors
- Young, H. P.
- Venue
- SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics
- Published
- 1975-06
- Volume
- 28
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 824-838
- ISSN
- 0036-1399 (ISSN-L)
- 1095-712X
- OpenAlex
- W2125453995
- Cited by
- 450
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 14.13
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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