Judgments of voluntary and physical causes in causal chains: probabilistic and social functionalist criteria for attributions
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Four experiments investigated judgments about voluntary human actions and physical causes that were embedded in causal chains ending in negative outcomes (e.g., a forest fire). Causes were judged for their explanatory quality, their effect on the probability of the outcome, and the extent to which they could be socially controlled. Results supported legal theorists' claim that voluntary actions are judged better explanations than physical causes. Indices derived from theories of probability change generally failed to predict the preference for voluntary actions. In contrast, this preference was mediated by the perceived extent to which voluntary versus physical causes may be brought under social control. These results suggest that causal explanation, at least within causal chains, is not driven solely by changes in the probability of an outcome when a cause is added, and that observers recognize the potential social function of explanations in drawing attention to socially controllable causes. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Cites
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BackgroundAttribution theory and research
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Self-citationAttribution of responsibility to the self and other in children and adults.
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Douglas, K. M., Sutton, R. M., Callan, M. J., Dawtry, R. J., & Harvey, A. J. (2016) · Thinking & Reasoning · doi:10.1080/13546783.2015.1051586 · Cited by 414
Self-citationJudgments of cause and blame: The effects of intentionality and foreseeability
Lagnado, D. A., & Channon, S. (2008) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2008.06.009 · Cited by 346
Causal–explanatory pluralism: How intentions, functions, and mechanisms influence causal ascriptions
Lombrozo, T. (2010) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.cogpsych.2010.05.002 · Cited by 313
Causal Responsibility and Robust Causation
Grinfeld, G., Lagnado, D., Gerstenberg, T., Woodward, J. F., & Usher, M. (2020) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01069 · Cited by 41
Social Attribution and Explanation
Hilton, D. (2017) · Oxford Handbooks Online · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199399550.013.33 · Cited by 37
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Metadata
- Authors
- McClure, J., Hilton, D. J., & Sutton, R. M.
- Venue
- European Journal of Social Psychology
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2007-08-31
- Volume
- 37
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 879-901
- ISSN
- 0046-2772 (ISSN-L)
- 1099-0992
- OpenAlex
- W1994111377
- Cited by
- 82
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 0.46
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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