Selecting explanations from causal chains: Do statistical principles explain preferences for voluntary causes?
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We investigate whether people prefer voluntary causes to physical causes in unfolding causal chains and whether statistical (covariation, sufficiency) principles can predict how people select explanations. Experiment 1 shows that while people tend to prefer a proximal (more recent) cause in chains of unfolding physical events, causality is traced through the proximal cause to an underlying distal (less recent) cause when that cause is a human action. Experiment 2 shows that causal preference is more strongly correlated with judgements of sufficiency and conditionalised sufficiency than with covariation or conditionalised covariation. In addition, sufficiency judgements are partial mediators of the effect of type of distal cause (voluntary or physical) on causal preference. The preference for voluntary causes to physical causes corroborates findings from social psychology, cognitive neuroscience and jurisprudence that emphasise the primacy of intentions in causal attribution processes. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Cites
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“For example, Keysers and Gazzola (2007) note that focusing on the causal power of intentional actions yields important adaptive advantages.”
BackgroundAttribution theory and research
Kelley, H. H., & Michela, J. L. (1980) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.ps.31.020180.002325 · Cited by 2,651
Social perception from visual cues: Role of the STS region
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Self-citationAttribution of responsibility to the self and other in children and adults.
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Cited by
Explanation in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Social Sciences
Miller, T. (2017) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1706.07269 · Cited by 5,338
Explanation in artificial intelligence: Insights from the social sciences
Miller, T. (2019) · Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1016/j.artint.2018.07.007 · Cited by 5,302
Judgments of cause and blame: The effects of intentionality and foreseeability
Lagnado, D. A., & Channon, S. (2008) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2008.06.009 · Cited by 346
Sloman, S. A., & Lagnado, D. (2015) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-010814-015135 · Cited by 210
Causal Responsibility and Counterfactuals
Lagnado, D. A., Gerstenberg, T., & Zultan, R. (2013) · Cognitive Science · doi:10.1111/cogs.12054 · Cited by 191
Metadata
- Authors
- Hilton, D. J., McClure, J., & Sutton, R. M.
- Venue
- European Journal of Social Psychology
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2009-03-22
- Volume
- 40
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 383-400
- ISSN
- 0046-2772 (ISSN-L)
- 1099-0992
- OpenAlex
- W2145240390
- Cited by
- 65
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 1.22
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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