Decentralisation and poverty reduction in Africa: the politics of local–central relations

Abstract

Decentralisation advocates argue that decentralised governments are more responsive to the needs of the poor than central governments and thus are more likely to conceive and implement pro‐poor policies. Recent evidence from a selected group of sub‐Saharan African countries is reviewed in a comparative framework that highlights factors associated with success in poverty reduction. It is argued that the degree of responsiveness to the poor and the extent to which there is an impact on poverty are determined primarily by the politics of local–central relations and the general regime context—particularly the ideological commitment of central political authorities to poverty reduction. In most of the cases, ‘elite capture’ of local power structures has been facilitated by the desire of ruling elites to create and sustain power bases in the countryside. Popular perceptions of the logic of patronage politics, combined with weak accountability mechanisms, have reinforced this outcome. The conclusion from these African cases is that decentralisation has not empowered challenges to local elites who are resistant or indifferent to pro‐poor policies. Thus, decentralisation is unlikely to lead to more pro‐poor outcomes without a serious effort to strengthen and broaden accountability mechanisms at both local and national levels. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.