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Do school accountability systems make it more difficult for low‐performing schools to attract and retain high‐quality teachers?

Clotfelter, Charles T., Ladd, Helen F., Vigdor, Jacob L., Diaz, Roger Aliaga·2004·Journal of Policy Analysis and Management

Abstract

Administrative data from North Carolina are used to explore the extent to which that state's relatively sophisticated school‐based accountability system has exacerbated the challenges that schools serving low‐performing students face in retaining and attracting high‐quality teachers. Most clear are the adverse effects on retention rates, and hence on teacher turnover, in such schools. Less clear is the extent to which that higher turnover has translated into a decline in the average qualifications of the teachers in the low‐performing schools. Other states with more primitive accountability systems can expect even greater adverse effects on teacher turnover in low‐performing schools. © 2004 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.

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Metadata

Authors
Clotfelter, C. T., Ladd, H. F., Vigdor, J. L., & Diaz, R. A.
Venue
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2004-03
Volume
23
Issue
2
Pages
251-271
ISSN
  • 0276-8739 (ISSN-L)
  • 1520-6688
OpenAlex
W2132381277
Cited by
224
References
0
FWCI
51.51
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Do school accountability systems make it more difficult for low‐performing schools to attract and retain high‐quality teachers? https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1002/pam.20003
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Clotfelter, C. T., Ladd, H. F., Vigdor, J. L., & Diaz, R. A. (2004). Do school accountability systems make it more difficult for low‐performing schools to attract and retain high‐quality teachers? Journal of Policy Analysis and Management. https://doi.org/10.1002/pam.20003

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