An assessment of automatic speaker verification vulnerabilities to replay spoofing attacks
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This paper analyses the threat of replay spoofing or presentation attacks in the context of automatic speaker verification. As relatively high‐technology attacks, speech synthesis and voice conversion, which have thus far received far greater attention in the literature, are probably beyond the means of the average fraudster. The implementation of replay attacks, in contrast, requires no specific expertise nor sophisticated equipment. Replay attacks are thus likely to be the most prolific in practice, while their impact is relatively under‐researched. The work presented here aims to compare at a high level the threat of replay attacks with those of speech synthesis and voice conversion. The comparison is performed using strictly controlled protocols and with six different automatic speaker verification systems including a state‐of‐the‐art iVector/probabilistic linear discriminant analysis system. Experiments show that low‐effort replay attacks present at least a comparable threat to speech synthesis and voice conversion. The paper also describes and assesses two replay attack countermeasures. A relatively new approach based on the local binary pattern analysis of speech spectrograms is shown to outperform a competing approach based on the detection of far‐field recordings. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Citations
Cites
Front-End Factor Analysis for Speaker Verification
Dehak, N., Kenny, P. J., Dehak, R., Dumouchel, P., & Ouellet, P. (2011) · IEEE Transactions on Audio, Speech, and Language Processing · doi:10.1109/tasl.2010.2064307 · Cited by 3,549
Spoofing and countermeasures for speaker verification: A survey
Wu, Z., Evans, N., Kinnunen, T., Yamagishi, J., Alegre, F., & Li, H. (2015) · Speech Communication · doi:10.1016/j.specom.2014.10.005 · Cited by 601
Self-citationASVspoof 2015: the first automatic speaker verification spoofing and countermeasures challenge
Wu, Z., Kinnunen, T., Evans, N., Yamagishi, J., Hanilçi, C., Sahidullah, M., & Sizov, A. (2015) · Interspeech 2015 · doi:10.21437/interspeech.2015-462 · Cited by 484 · cited 3×
“For example, other authors [27,29,30], show greater vulnerabilities for speech synthesis.”
BackgroundMethodSelf-citationA comparison of features for synthetic speech detection
Sahidullah, M., Kinnunen, T., & Hanilçi, C. (2015) · Interspeech 2015 · doi:10.21437/interspeech.2015-472 · Cited by 382 · cited 1×
“these findings conflict with other researchers’ results [71] published after the completion of this work.”
ResultExplicit modelling of state occupancy in hidden Markov models for automatic speech recognition
Russell, M., & Moore, R. (1985) · ICASSP '85. IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing · doi:10.1109/icassp.1985.1168477 · Cited by 194 · cited 1×
“Acoustic spectral characteristics and duration probabilities are modelled using multispace distribution hidden semiMarkov models (MSD-HSMM) [22].”
Method“Preventing replay attacks on speaker verification systems,”
Villalba, J., & Lleida, E. (2011) · 2011 Carnahan Conference on Security Technology · doi:10.1109/ccst.2011.6095943 · Cited by 108 · cited 3×
“This idea was first investigated in [44].”
MethodInfluentialChannel pattern noise based playback attack detection algorithm for speaker recognition
Wang, Z.-F., Wei, G., & He, Q.-H. (2011) · 2011 International Conference on Machine Learning and Cybernetics · doi:10.1109/icmlc.2011.6016982 · Cited by 101 · cited 1×
“Two such algorithms are reported in [41] for which the EER for a baseline GMM system with a universal background model (UBM) was shown to decrease from 40% to 10% with active countermeasures.”
MethodAlegre, F., Vipperla, R., & Evans, N. (2012) · Interspeech 2012 · doi:10.21437/interspeech.2012-462 · Cited by 43
Self-citation
Cited by
ASVspoof 2019: Future Horizons in Spoofed and Fake Audio Detection
Todisco, M., Wang, X., Vestman, V., Sahidullah, M., Delgado, H., Nautsch, A., Yamagishi, J., Evans, N., Kinnunen, T., & Lee, K. A. (2019) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1904.05441 · Cited by 688
“Inspired by work to analyse and improve ASV reliability in reverberant conditions [13, 14] and a similar approach used in the study of replay reported in [15], both bona fide data and spoofed data contained in the PA database are generated according to a simulation [16, 17, 18] of their presentation to the microphone…”
MethodSelf-citationASVspoof 2019: Future Horizons in Spoofed and Fake Audio Detection
Todisco, M., Wang, X., Vestman, V., Sahidullah, M., Delgado, H., Nautsch, A., Yamagishi, J., Evans, N., Kinnunen, T. H., & Lee, K. A. (2019) · Interspeech 2019 · doi:10.21437/interspeech.2019-2249 · Cited by 687
Self-citationASVspoof 2019: A large-scale public database of synthesized, converted and replayed speech
Wang, X., Yamagishi, J., Todisco, M., Delgado, H., Nautsch, A., Evans, N., Sahidullah, M., Vestman, V., Kinnunen, T., Lee, K. A., et al. (2020) · Computer Speech & Language · doi:10.1016/j.csl.2020.101114 · Cited by 505
Self-citationNautsch, A., Wang, X., Evans, N., Kinnunen, T. H., Vestman, V., Todisco, M., Delgado, H., Sahidullah, M., Yamagishi, J., & Lee, K. A. (2021) · IEEE Transactions on Biometrics, Behavior, and Identity Science · doi:10.1109/tbiom.2021.3059479 · Cited by 185
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Metadata
- Authors
- Janicki, A., Alegre, F., & Evans, N.
- Venue
- Security and Communication Networks
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2016-07-04
- Volume
- 9
- Issue
- 15
- Pages
- 3030-3044
- ISSN
- 1939-0114 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-0122
- OpenAlex
- W2472787443
- Cited by
- 42
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 3.32
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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