The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Board vigilance, director experience, and corporate outcomes
Abstract
Agency‐based studies of boards of directors address factors relevant to board vigilance with respect to the monitoring of senior managers. We argue that relying solely on director vigilance may be limiting because vigilance without relevant experience is unlikely to ensure board effectiveness. Our contention is that boards comprising vigilant directors, as well as directors with appropriate knowledge gained through experience, not only will be better monitors, but also more useful advisors to top managers. The focus of our study is on the effect on acquisition outcomes of the interaction of board vigilance and director experiential learning. Consistent with our expectations, the empirical findings indicate that vigilant boards rich in appropriate experience are associated with superior acquisition outcomes. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Cites
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Cited by
The Effect of Board Characteristics on Firm Environmental Performance
de Villiers, C., Naiker, V., & van Staden, C. J. (2011) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0149206311411506 · Cited by 1,189
Board Composition Beyond Independence: Social Capital, Human Capital, and Demographics
Johnson, S. G., Schnatterly, K., & Hill, A. D. (2013) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0149206312463938 · Cited by 616
Tuggle, C. S., Sirmon, D. G., Reutzel, C. R., & Bierman, L. (2010) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.847 · Cited by 498
Is Environmental Governance Substantive or Symbolic? An Empirical Investigation
Rodrigue, M., Magnan, M., & Cho, C. H. (2013) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-012-1331-5 · Cited by 434
Family ownership and acquisition behavior in publicly‐traded companies
Miller, D., Le Breton‐Miller, I., & Lester, R. H. (2010) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.802 · Cited by 392
Metadata
- Authors
- Kroll, M., Walters, B. A., & Wright, P.
- Venue
- Strategic Management Journal
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2008-02-26
- Volume
- 29
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 363-382
- ISSN
- 0143-2095 (ISSN-L)
- 1097-0266
- OpenAlex
- W2002420282
- Cited by
- 406
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 38.39
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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