Cited by 108Quantum Information and CryptographyCryptography and Data SecurityCryptography and Residue Arithmetic

Securing the future internet of things with post‐quantum cryptography

Open access
Kumar, Adarsh, Ottaviani, Carlo, Gill, Sukhpal Singh, Buyya, Rajkumar·2022·SECURITY AND PRIVACY

Abstract

Traditional and lightweight cryptography primitives and protocols are insecure against quantum attacks. Thus, a real‐time application using traditional or lightweight cryptography primitives and protocols does not ensure full‐proof security. Post‐quantum cryptography is important for the internet of things (IoT) due to its security against quantum attacks. This paper offers a broad literature analysis of post‐quantum cryptography for IoT networks, including the challenges and research directions to adopt in real‐time applications. The work draws focus towards post‐quantum cryptosystems that are useful for resource‐constraint devices. Further, those quantum attacks are surveyed, which may occur over traditional and lightweight cryptographic primitives.

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Registry

Crossref · 10.1002/spy2.200

Cites

25 of 25 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • Nokia's MEC video surveillance application enables security personnel to analyze unusual activities from anywhere at any time.

    “One example of a MEC application from Nokia is video surveillance which enables security personnel the ability to analyse unusual activities from anywhere at any time [131].”

    From Edge AI: A survey (2023) · cites this paper as [131]

    The Introduction (p. 1) describes IoT security and post-quantum cryptography, not Nokia’s MEC applications. Searches for Nokia, video surveillance, and remote analysis of unusual activities found no passage addressing the claim in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.76)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Because edge AI is decentralised and can function without an active internet connection, it is inherently more secure.

    “Availability: Given that edge AI is both decentralised and can function without an active internet connection, it is inherently more secure [131].”

    From Edge AI: A survey (2023) · cites this paper as [131]

    The Introduction (p. 1) discusses securing IoT devices with post-quantum cryptography, and the Conclusions (p. 10) discuss cryptographic schemes for those devices. Searches for edge AI operating without internet connectivity and for decentralisation as a security advantage found no passage addressing the claim. (LLM, conf=0.76)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • The major challenge to Edge Computing is security for users who may trust hardware manufacturers but lack access to identities of other components such as switches, routers, and base stations in publicly accessible modes.

    “The major challenge to Edge Computing is that of security for users who may have confidence in hardware from manufacturers they trust but have no access to the identities of other components: switches, routers and base stations in publicly accessible modes [114,131].”

    From Edge AI: A survey (2023) · cites this paper as [131]

    The Introduction (p. 1) discusses security threats to resource-constrained IoT devices, and the Challenges section (pp. 2–3) addresses post-quantum cryptography for IoT networks. Searches for trusted manufacturers, component identities, switches, routers, and base stations found no passage addressing the claimed Edge Computing security problem. (LLM, conf=0.76)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

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Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

1 of the 26 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.

Research works printed but not linked: 3

  1. [14]14. Malina, L., Popelova, L., Dzurenda, P., Hajny, J. and Martinasek, Z., 2018. On feasibility of postquantum cryptography on small devices. IFAC-PapersOnLine, 51(6), pp.462-467.
  2. [21]21. Cohen, A., D'Oliveira, R.G., Salamatian, S. and Médard, M., 2021. Network Coding -Based PostQuantum Cryptography. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Information Theory , 2 (1), pp.49-64.
  3. [23]23. Ilic, N. (2007). The ekert protocol. Journal of Phy334, 1, 22.

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Authors
Kumar, A., Ottaviani, C., Gill, S. S., & Buyya, R.
Affiliations
  • University of Petroleum and Energy Studies (IN)
  • University of York (GB)
  • Queen Mary University of London (GB)
  • The University of Melbourne (AU)
Corresponding author
Gill, Sukhpal Singh
Venue
SECURITY AND PRIVACY
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2021-12-09
Volume
5
Issue
2
ISSN
2475-6725 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W4200100773
Cited by
108
References
26
Citations by year
2026: 23 · 2025: 34 · 2024: 23 · 2023: 20 · 2022: 8
FWCI
4.51
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Security and Privacy (publishedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (acceptedVersion)
  • Queen Mary Research Online (Queen Mary University of London) (submittedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Quantum Information and Cryptography
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Cryptography and Data Security
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Cryptography and Residue Arithmetic
Keywords
post-quantum cryptography, Internet of Things, quantum attacks, lightweight cryptography, resource-constrained devices, ciphers, Internet of Things security, real-time applications

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