The Epistemology of Prejudice
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
According to a common view, prejudice always involves some form of epistemic culpability, i.e., a failure to respond to evidence in the appropriate way. I argue that the common view wrongfully assumes that prejudices always involve universal generalizations. After motivating the more plausible thesis that prejudices typically involve a species of generic judgment, I show that standard examples provide no grounds for positing a strong connection between prejudice and epistemic culpability. More generally, the common view fails to recognize the extent to which prejudices are epistemically insidious: once they are internalized as background beliefs, they quite reasonably come to control the assessment and interpretation of new evidence. This property of insidiousness helps explain why prejudices are so recalcitrant to empirical counterevidence and also why they are frequently invisible to introspective reflection.
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Citations
Cites
Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing
Fricker, M. (2007) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237907.001.0001 · Cited by 9,198
Cultural transmission of social essentialism
Rhodes, M., Leslie, S.-J., & Tworek, C. M. (2012) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1208951109 · Cited by 412 · cited 6×
“9 See Rhodes et al. 2012 for recent work exploring the role of generic language in disseminating and sustaining social stereotyping from early childhood.”
BackgroundInfluentialThe Original Sin of Cognition: Fear, Prejudice, and Generalization
Leslie, S.-J., & Journal of Philosophy Inc. (2017) · Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.5840/jphil2017114828 · Cited by 251
Cited by
ECHO CHAMBERS AND EPISTEMIC BUBBLES
Nguyen, C. T. (2020) · Episteme · doi:10.1017/epi.2018.32 · Cited by 1,115
Transparency in Algorithmic and Human Decision-Making: Is There a Double Standard?
Zerilli, J., Knott, A., Maclaurin, J., & Gavaghan, C. (2019) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-018-0330-6 · Cited by 420
“Many human biases could be thought to result from the misfiring of an ancient and conserved cognitive adaptation to make generic judgements (Begby 2013; Leslie 2017).”
BackgroundBasu, R. (2019) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-018-1137-0 · Cited by 206
Intellectually Humble, but Prejudiced People. A Paradox of Intellectual Virtue
Colombo, M., Strangmann, K., Houkes, L., Kostadinova, Z., & Brandt, M. J. (2021) · Review of Philosophy and Psychology · doi:10.1007/s13164-020-00496-4 · Cited by 19
“Begby (2013) explains that some prejudices become entrenched background beliefs based on support from multiple sources of evidence.”
BackgroundInfluential
Metadata
- Authors
- Begby, E., & Philosophy Documentation Center
- Venue
- Thought: A Journal of Philosophy
- Publisher
- Philosophy Documentation Center
- Published
- 2013
- Volume
- 2
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 90-99
- ISSN
- 2161-2234 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1605641722
- Cited by
- 86
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 4.86
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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