Attributions of consciousness
Abstract
Many philosophers and brain scientists hold that explaining consciousness is one of the major outstanding problems facing modern science today. One type of consciousness in particular—phenomenal consciousness—is thought to be especially problematic. The reasons given for believing that this phenomenon exists in the first place, however, often hinge on the claim that its existence is simply obvious in ordinary perceptual experience. Such claims motivate the study of people's intuitions about consciousness. In recent years a number of researchers in experimental philosophy of mind have begun to shed light on this area, investigating how people understand and attribute those mental states that have been thought to be phenomenally conscious. In this article, we discuss the philosophical concept of phenomenal consciousness and detail the work that has been done on the question of whether lay people have this concept. WIREs Cogn Sci 2014, 5:635–648. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1320 This article is categorized under: Philosophy > Consciousness
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These asymmetric attributions suggest that non-experts may lack a unified concept of phenomenal consciousness.
“These asymmetric attributions suggest that non-experts may lack a unified concept of phenomenal consciousness (for discussions, see Sytsma 2014, Sytsma and Ozdemir 2019, Reuter 2022, Phelan 2023).”
From Folk psychological attributions of consciousness to large language models (2024) · cites this paper as Sytsma 2014
The correspondence between the Experience/Agency dimensions and phenomenality is not clear, and more recent work has found evidence for alternative structures that cut across this distinction.
“However, the correspondence between these dimensions and phenomenality is not clear (Sytsma 2014) and more recent work has found evidence for alternative structures that cut across this distinction (e.g. Weisman et al. 2017, Malle 2019).”
From Folk psychological attributions of consciousness to large language models (2024) · cites this paper as Sytsma 2014
Non-experts do attribute mental states that philosophers typically consider to be phenomenally conscious.
“but non-experts do attribute mental states that philosophers typically consider to be phenomenally conscious.”
From Folk psychological attributions of consciousness to large language models (2024) · cites this paper as Sytsma 2014
In the current study, the main question about ChatGPT's capacity for phenomenal experience was preceded by an explanation of the concept of phenomenality, which may have induced participants to consider a concept they would not otherwise consider spontaneously.
“In the current study, the main question about ChatGPT’s capacity for phenomenal experience was preceded by an explanation of the concept of phenomenality—which may have induced participants to consider a concept they would not otherwise consider spontaneously (Sytsma 2014).”
From Folk psychological attributions of consciousness to large language models (2024) · cites this paper as Sytsma 2014
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Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Science of Consciousness
Butlin, P., Long, R., Elmoznino, E., Bengio, Y., Birch, J., Constant, A., Deane, G., Fleming, S. M., Frith, C., Ji, X., et al. (2023) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2308.08708 · Cited by 196 · see citing works
Folk psychological attributions of consciousness to large language models
Colombatto, C., & Fleming, S. M. (2024) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niae013 · Cited by 96 · see citing works
“In the current study, the main question about ChatGPT’s capacity for phenomenal experience was preceded by an explanation of the concept of phenomenality—which may have induced participants to consider a concept they would not otherwise consider spontaneously (Sytsma 2014).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialKang, B., Kim, J., Yun, T.-R., Bae, H., & Kim, C.-E. (2025) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2502.15365 · Cited by 6
Kang, B., Kim, J., Yun, T., Bae, H., & Kim, C.-E. (2026) · Computers in Human Behavior Reports · doi:10.1016/j.chbr.2025.100901 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
- Authors
- Sytsma, J.
- Affiliations
- Victoria University of Wellington (NZ)
- Corresponding author
- Sytsma, Justin
- ORCID
- Sytsma, Justin
- Venue
- WIREs Cognitive Science
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2014-09-16
- Volume
- 5
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 635-648
- ISSN
- 1939-5078 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-5086
- OpenAlex
- W1794871629
- Cited by
- 20
- References
- 8
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 2 · 2019: 1 · 2018: 1 · 2017: 3 · 2015: 1
- FWCI
- 1.85
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews Cognitive Science (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- PhilSci-Archive (University of Pittsburgh) (acceptedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Free Will and Agency
- Keywords
- phenomenal consciousness, lay intuitions, mental states, phenomenal experience, philosophy of mind
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