Cited by 324Logic, Reasoning, and KnowledgeCategorization, perception, and languageDecision-Making and Behavioral Economics

The Probability Heuristics Model of Syllogistic Reasoning

Chater, Nick, Oaksford, Mike·1999·Cognitive Psychology

Abstract

A probability heuristic model (PHM) for syllogistic reasoning is proposed. An informational ordering over quantified statements suggests simple probability based heuristics for syllogistic reasoning. The most important is the "min-heuristic": choose the type of the least informative premise as the type of the conclusion. The rationality of this heuristic is confirmed by an analysis of the probabilistic validity of syllogistic reasoning which treats logical inference as a limiting case of probabilistic inference. A meta-analysis of past experiments reveals close fits with PHM. PHM also compares favorably with alternative accounts, including mental logics, mental models, and deduction as verbal reasoning. Crucially, PHM extends naturally to generalized quantifiers, such as Most and Few, which have not been characterized logically and are, consequently, beyond the scope of current mental logic and mental model theories. Two experiments confirm the novel predictions of PHM when generalized quantifiers are used in syllogistic arguments. PHM suggests that syllogistic reasoning performance may be determined by simple but rational informational strategies justified by probability theory rather than by logic.

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Crossref · 10.1006/cogp.1998.0696

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  • The Bayesian framework connects to a venerable tradition of understanding cognition as rational or optimal within constraints.

    “Moreover, the Bayesian framework connects to a venerable tradition of understanding cognition as rational or optimal within constraints (Anderson 2013; Chater and Oaksford 1999).”

    From The myth of the Bayesian brain (2025) · cites this paper as Chater and Oaksford 1999

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References 162 · Cited by 324

Authors
Chater, N., & Oaksford, M.
Affiliations
Cardiff University (GB)
Venue
Cognitive Psychology
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
1999-03
Volume
38
Issue
2
Pages
191-258
ISSN
0010-0285 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2029189910
Cited by
324
References
162
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 20 · 2023: 7 · 2022: 24 · 2021: 11 · 2020: 12 · 2019: 45 · 2018: 14 · 2017: 10 · 2016: 9 · 2015: 10 · 2014: 12 · 2013: 9 · 2012: 9
FWCI
12.00
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Cognitive Psychology (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • BIROn (Birkbeck, University of London) (submittedVersion)
  • UCL Discovery (University College London) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Categorization, perception, and language
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
Keywords
syllogistic reasoning, probabilistic inference, generalized quantifiers, logical inference, mental logic, mental models, verbal reasoning, deductive reasoning
MeSH terms
Algorithms, Analysis of Variance, Humans, Logic, Models, Psychological, Probability, Reproducibility of Results

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