Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.
CoChat

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 203 of the 204 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 62 of the 183 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

The myth of the Bayesian brain

Open access
Mangalam, Madhur · 2025 · European Journal of Applied Physiology

Abstract

The Bayesian brain hypothesis-the idea that neural systems implement or approximate Bayesian inference-has become a dominant framework in cognitive neuroscience over the past two decades. While mathematically elegant and conceptually unifying, this paper argues that the hypothesis occupies an ambiguous territory between useful metaphor and testable, biologically plausible mechanistic explanation. We critically examine the key claims of the Bayesian brain hypothesis, highlighting issues of unfalsifiability, biological implausibility, and inconsistent empirical support. The framework's remarkable flexibility in accommodating diverse findings raises concerns about its explanatory power, as models can often be adjusted post hoc to fit virtually any data pattern. We contrast the Bayesian approach with alternative frameworks, including dynamic systems theory, ecological psychology, and embodied cognition, which conceptualize prediction and adaptive behavior without recourse to probabilistic inference. Despite its limitations, the Bayesian brain hypothesis persists-driven less by empirical grounding than by its mathematical elegance, metaphorical power, and institutional momentum.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

This paper argues that the “Bayesian brain” is better understood as a powerful metaphor than as a biologically grounded mechanistic theory: it is flexible, hard to falsify, and often unsupported by neural implementation evidence. The author contrasts it with dynamic systems, ecological, and embodied approaches, and calls for post-Bayesian neuroscience grounded in biological constraints and explicit, risky predictions.

Key findings

  • The paper claims the Bayesian brain framework is ambiguous between metaphor and mechanism, and that this slippage weakens its scientific status; the framework is described as “self-sealing” and potentially “unfalsifiable.”
  • It argues that Bayesian models can be fit post hoc to “virtually any observed data pattern” by adjusting priors, likelihoods, noise, or hierarchy, making the theory too flexible to strongly constrain outcomes.
  • The paper says empirical support is mixed: some findings are presented as Bayesian “successes” (e.g., multisensory integration, visual illusions, motor control), but these are often consistent with other explanations and frequently rely on retrofitted priors or unclear neural implementation.
  • The paper identifies biological implausibilities, including the difficulty of encoding full probability distributions, the computational burden of real-time Bayesian updating, and mismatches with non-Gaussian, multistable, state-dependent neural dynamics.

Methods

  • Conceptual and critical review of the Bayesian brain hypothesis, predictive coding, and the Free Energy Principle; the paper also contrasts them with dynamic systems theory, ecological psychology, and embodied/enactive cognition.
  • Uses qualitative argumentation and literature-based critique rather than new experiments or original data; it discusses examples from perception, action, learning, and psychiatry, and proposes a hypothetical “crucial experiment.”
  • Main analysis focuses on conceptual drift (metaphor vs. mechanism), falsifiability criteria, empirical mismatches, and neurobiological feasibility.

Limitations

  • The paper itself notes that a full comparative evaluation of alternative frameworks is beyond its scope.
  • It also says the proposed critical experiment and falsifiability criteria are conceptual, not a completed empirical test.
  • Evident from the text: the argument is a narrative/literature-based critique without new data or systematic meta-analysis, so its conclusions depend on interpretation of prior studies rather than direct experimental adjudication.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1007/s00421-025-05855-6

Cites

203 of 203 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Figures

Fig. 1 A schematic representation of the Bayesian brain hypothesis, illustrating how the brain integrates prior beliefs (hypotheses) with incoming sensory inputs to generate predictions and update internal models. Sensory inputs (blue arrows) from the environment—including visual, auditory, and proprioceptive signals—are compared against internally generated sensory predictions (purple arrows) derived from prior beliefs about the world. Prediction errors (PE), calculated as the discrepancy between expected and actual input, are used to update beliefs (green arrows) and expected value (EV), adjusting the brain’s internal model through processes such as error-based learning and reinforcement learning. The brain minimizes prediction error, refining its model to interpret better and anticipate sensory information. This framework is foundational to predictive coding theories and active inference in neuroscience. Figure reproduced from Keysers et al. (2024). Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)
Fig. 1 A schematic representation of the Bayesian brain hypothesis, illustrating how the brain integrates prior beliefs (hypotheses) with incoming sensory inputs to generate predictions and update internal models. Sensory inputs (blue arrows) from the environment—including visual, auditory, and proprioceptive signals—are compared against internally generated sensory predictions (purple arrows) derived from prior beliefs about the world. Prediction errors (PE), calculated as the discrepancy between expected and actual input, are used to update beliefs (green arrows) and expected value (EV), adjusting the brain’s internal model through processes such as error-based learning and reinforcement learning. The brain minimizes prediction error, refining its model to interpret better and anticipate sensory information. This framework is foundational to predictive coding theories and active inference in neuroscience. Figure reproduced from Keysers et al. (2024). Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)CC BY · PubMed Central
Fig. 2 The unfalsifiability problem in Bayesian brain models. This flowchart illustrates the methodological circularity that renders the Bayesian brain hypothesis effectively unfalsifiable. When experimental evidence contradicts Bayesian predictions (e.g., “brain minimizes prediction error”), researchers rarely reject the framework. Instead, they systematically protect the Bayesian paradigm through post-hoc adjustments—either by adding auxiliary hypotheses (“subject to computational constraints”) or redefining Bayesian parameters (“adjusted priors/precision weights”). These adjustments create a self-reinforcing cycle that transforms empirical failures into theoretical successes, immunizing the framework against genuine falsification. This circular reasoning pattern reveals why Bayesian approaches persist despite repeated predictive failures: the theory automatically accommodates contradictory evidence through an endless proliferation of auxiliary hypotheses. As argued throughout this manuscript, this methodological structure violates Popperian standards of scientific testability, functioning more as mathematical rhetoric than as an empirically accountable mechanistic model of neural function
Fig. 2 The unfalsifiability problem in Bayesian brain models. This flowchart illustrates the methodological circularity that renders the Bayesian brain hypothesis effectively unfalsifiable. When experimental evidence contradicts Bayesian predictions (e.g., “brain minimizes prediction error”), researchers rarely reject the framework. Instead, they systematically protect the Bayesian paradigm through post-hoc adjustments—either by adding auxiliary hypotheses (“subject to computational constraints”) or redefining Bayesian parameters (“adjusted priors/precision weights”). These adjustments create a self-reinforcing cycle that transforms empirical failures into theoretical successes, immunizing the framework against genuine falsification. This circular reasoning pattern reveals why Bayesian approaches persist despite repeated predictive failures: the theory automatically accommodates contradictory evidence through an endless proliferation of auxiliary hypotheses. As argued throughout this manuscript, this methodological structure violates Popperian standards of scientific testability, functioning more as mathematical rhetoric than as an empirically accountable mechanistic model of neural functionCC BY · PubMed Central
Fig. 3 Illustrative examples of the conceptual overextension of the “Markov blanket” construct across ontologically disparate systems. While originally formalized as a boundary condition in graphical models of statistical dependency, the term has increasingly been applied to biological, cognitive, and even sociocultural entities—from neurons and cells to flames, microbes, nation-states, and human collectives. This proliferation raises concerns about the dilution of mechanistic specificity and the erosion of explanatory constraint within theoretical neuroscience
Fig. 3 Illustrative examples of the conceptual overextension of the “Markov blanket” construct across ontologically disparate systems. While originally formalized as a boundary condition in graphical models of statistical dependency, the term has increasingly been applied to biological, cognitive, and even sociocultural entities—from neurons and cells to flames, microbes, nation-states, and human collectives. This proliferation raises concerns about the dilution of mechanistic specificity and the erosion of explanatory constraint within theoretical neuroscienceCC BY · PubMed Central

Verification

Claims the paper makes

42 Valid · 3 Not valid · 66 Not checked · 135 Own results and interpretations

159 more claims · 29 with their cited sources checked

Create a free account to see all 246 claims and to verify the 3 references still open.

See all claims — free account
  • Probably not a substantial claim. 48
  • It may state two separate claims as one. 43

Create a free account to see these claims.

Citations

Cites

Show all 204 references

Research works printed but not linked: 5

  1. Dennett D (1987) The Intentional Stance. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
  2. Lakoff G, Johnson M (1980) Metaphors We Live By. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL
  3. MacKay DJ (2003) Information Theory. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, Inference and Learning Algorithms
  4. Michaels CF, Carello C (1981) Direct Perception. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ
  5. Noë A (2004) Action in Perception. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA

Cited by

See all 14

Metadata

Authors
Mangalam, M.
Affiliations
University of Nebraska at Omaha (US)
Corresponding author
Mangalam, Madhur
Venue
European Journal of Applied Physiology
Published
2025-06-26
Volume
125
Issue
10
Pages
2643-2677
ISSN
  • 0020-9376 (ISSN-L)
  • 1439-6319
  • 1439-6327
OpenAlex
W4411669101
Cited by
14
References
204
Citations by year
2026: 10 · 2025: 4
FWCI
2.33
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • European Journal of Applied Physiology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • DigitalCommons@UNO (submittedVersion, cc-by)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Cognitive Science and Education Research
Keywords
Bayesian brain hypothesis, Bayesian inference, unfalsifiability, biological plausibility, prediction, dynamical systems theory, ecological psychology, embodied cognition, probabilistic inference, explanatory power
MeSH terms
Animals, Bayes Theorem, Brain, Cognition, Humans, Models, Neurological

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

The claim verdicts this report counts are experimental: their accuracy is not yet measured.

A language model drew the claims from the paper on 2026-10-09, under version 3 of the claim definition (model deepseek-v4.1-flash, prompt extract-v3).

A second model labelled each claim on 2026-10-09 (model jev-1.13-20260917, definition revision gold-guideline-v0.2).

Cited sources are checked with a language model’s help (gpt-6-sol).

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The myth of the Bayesian brain. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/s00421-025-05855-6
The paper
Mangalam, M. (2025). The myth of the Bayesian brain. European Journal of Applied Physiology. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00421-025-05855-6

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.