The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures
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Citations
Cites
College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
Gale, D., & Shapley, L. S. (1962) · The American Mathematical Monthly · doi:10.1080/00029890.1962.11989827 · Cited by 5,985
College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
Gale, D., & Shapley, L. S. (1962) · American Mathematical Monthly · doi:10.2307/2312726 · Cited by 2,082
The assignment game I: The core
Shapley, L. S., & Shubik, M. (1971) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01753437 · Cited by 1,682
Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis
Roth, A. E., & Sotomayor, M. A. O. (1990) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/ccol052139015x · Cited by 1,340
Scarf, H. E. (1967) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1909383 · Cited by 688
Core in a simple coalition formation game
Banerjee, S., Konishi, H., & Sönmez, T. (2001) · Social Choice and Welfare · doi:10.1007/s003550000067 · Cited by 523
Strong tiebout equilibrium under restricted preferences domain
Greenberg, J., & Weber, S. (1986) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(86)90090-6 · Cited by 182
Kaneko, M., & Wooders, M. H. (1982) · Mathematical Social Sciences · doi:10.1016/0165-4896(82)90015-4 · Cited by 171
Intermediate preferences and stable coalition structures
Demange, G. (1994) · Journal of Mathematical Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-4068(94)90035-3 · Cited by 157
Second best taxation as a game
Guesnerie, R., & Oddou, C. (1981) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(81)90017-x · Cited by 110
Coalition formation games with separable preferences
Burani, N., & Zwicker, W. S. (2003) · Mathematical Social Sciences · doi:10.1016/s0165-4896(02)00082-3 · Cited by 73
Chapter 37 Coalition structures
Greenberg, J. (1994) · Handbook of game theory and economic applications · doi:10.1016/s1574-0005(05)80069-4 · Cited by 34
Cited by
An Information Flow Model for Conflict and Fission in Small Groups
Zachary, W. W. (1977) · Journal of Anthropological Research · doi:10.1086/jar.33.4.3629752 · Cited by 4,704
Cooperative Game Theory Approaches for Network Partitioning
Avrachenkov, K. E., Kondratev, A. Y., & Mazalov, V. V. (2017) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-62389-4_49 · Cited by 1,073
Coalitional game theory for communication networks
Saad, W., Han, Z., Debbah, M., Hjorungnes, A., & Basar, T. (2009) · IEEE Signal Processing Magazine · doi:10.1109/msp.2009.000000 · Cited by 1,051
Core in a simple coalition formation game
Banerjee, S., Konishi, H., & Sönmez, T. (2001) · Social Choice and Welfare · doi:10.1007/s003550000067 · Cited by 523
Computational Aspects of Cooperative Game Theory
Chalkiadakis, G., Elkind, E., & Wooldridge, M. (2012) · Synthesis Lectures on Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-01558-8 · Cited by 337
Metadata
- Authors
- Bogomolnaia, A., & Jackson, M. O.
- Venue
- Games and Economic Behavior
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2002-02
- Volume
- 38
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 201-230
- ISSN
- 0899-8256 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2134660637
- Cited by
- 822
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 36.69
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.