The DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Core in a simple coalition formation game
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Cites
College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
Gale, D., & Shapley, L. S. (1962) · The American Mathematical Monthly · doi:10.1080/00029890.1962.11989827 · Cited by 5,985
Becker, G. S. (1973) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260084 · Cited by 3,484
A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks
Jackson, M. O., & Wolinsky, A. (1996) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1006/jeth.1996.0108 · Cited by 2,588
Two Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis.
Kamecke, U., Roth, A. E., & Sotomayor, M. A. O. (1992) · Economica · doi:10.2307/2554894 · Cited by 1,625
The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures
Bogomolnaia, A., & Jackson, M. O. (2002) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.2001.0877 · Cited by 822
Scarf, H. E. (1967) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1909383 · Cited by 688
Becker, G. S. (1974) · NBER Chapters · Cited by 682
(1973) · RAND Corporation eBooks · doi:10.7249/r1056-1 · Cited by 584
Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
Roth, A. E., & Postlewaite, A. (1977) · Journal of Mathematical Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-4068(77)90004-0 · Cited by 378
Strong tiebout equilibrium under restricted preferences domain
Greenberg, J., & Weber, S. (1986) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(86)90090-6 · Cited by 182
Cited by
The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures
Bogomolnaia, A., & Jackson, M. O. (2002) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.2001.0877 · Cited by 822
Algorithmics of Matching Under Preferences
Manlove, D. F. (2013) · Series on Theoretical Computer Science · doi:10.1142/8591 · Cited by 515
A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation
Ray, D. (2007) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199207954.001.0001 · Cited by 379
A Survey of Models of Network Formation: Stability and Efficiency
Jackson, M. O. (2003) · CaltechAUTHORS (California Institute of Technology) · doi:10.7907/c4y9t-bg336 · Cited by 374
Computational Aspects of Cooperative Game Theory
Chalkiadakis, G., Elkind, E., & Wooldridge, M. (2012) · Synthesis Lectures on Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-01558-8 · Cited by 337
Metadata
- Authors
- Banerjee, S., Konishi, H., & Sönmez, T.
- Venue
- Social Choice and Welfare
- Published
- 2001-01-11
- Volume
- 18
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 135-153
- ISSN
- 0176-1714 (ISSN-L)
- 1432-217X
- OpenAlex
- W2141263345
- Cited by
- 523
- References
- 17
- FWCI
- 31.32
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.